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ABSTRACT
Does media bias affect voting? We address this question by looking at the entry of Fox News in
cable markets and its impact on voting. Between October 1996 and November 2000, the conservative
Fox News Channel was introduced in the cable programming of 20 percent of US towns. Fox News
availability in 2000 appears to be largely idiosyncratic. Using a data set of voting data for 9,256
towns, we investigate if Republicans gained vote share in towns where Fox News entered the cable
market by the year 2000. We find a significant effect of the introduction of Fox News on the vote
share in Presidential elections between 1996 and 2000. Republicans gain 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points
in the towns which broadcast Fox News. The results are robust to town-level controls, district and
county fixed effects, and alternative specifications. We also find a significant effect of Fox News on
Senate vote share and on voter turnout. Our estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 8 percent
of its viewers to vote Republican. We interpret the results in light of a simple model of voter learning
about media bias and about politician quality. The Fox News effect could be a temporary learning













ekaplan@iies.su.se 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over 70 percent of Americans believe that there is a great deal or a fair amount of media
bias in news coverage (Pew, 2004). Evidence of bias ranges from the topic choice of the New
York Times (Puglisi, 2004) to the choice of think-tanks that the media refer to (Groseclose
and Milyo, 2004). Media bias was even more prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th century
(Gentzkow, Glaeser, Goldin, 2005).
This evidence, however, leaves open the question of whether media bias matters. Does
media bias aﬀect the political beliefs of the audience? Does it change voting behavior? These
are key questions for economics and political science that the media bias literature1 has yet to
address.
The answers to these questions also have implications for policy, such as for the regulation
of media concentration. If media bias alters voting behavior, deregulation of media markets
may have a large impact on political outcomes.
In this paper, we present empirical evidence on the impact of media bias on voting. We
consider one of the most signiﬁcant changes in the US media in recent years, the entry and
expansion of the Fox News cable channel. We exploit the natural experiment induced by the
timing of the entry of Fox News in local cable markets and consider the impact on voting.
We employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology and compare changes in the Republican
vote share for towns where Fox News was introduced before the 2000 elections to towns where
it was not present by 2000. We exploit three key elements of the Fox News natural experiment,
the fast expansion, the geographical diﬀerentiation, and the conservative slant in its coverage.
The 24-hour Fox News channel was introduced by Rupert Murdoch in October 1996 to
compete with CNN. Like CNN, it was oﬀered only via cable and, to a smaller extent, via
satellite. Thanks to an aggressive marketing campaign, a number of cable companies added
Fox News to their programming over the next four years. The geographical expansion was
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the audience share. By June 2000, 17.3 percent
of the US population reported watching Fox News regularly (Scarborough Research data).
The nature of the cable industry induces substantial geographical variation in access to
Fox News. Cable markets are natural monopolies with capacity constraints on the number of
channels. The availability of Fox News in a town depends on whether the local cable company
decides to add it to the programming, possibly at the expense of another channel. Cable
companies in neighboring towns often make diﬀerent decisions, creating idiosyncratic variation
in access. This allows us to compare voting patterns in neighboring towns which are similar
except for the availability of Fox News.
Even given the sudden expansion and popularity of Fox News, and the variation in Fox News
1The theoretical studies include Baron (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro (forthcoming), and Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005).
1diﬀusion, it is unclear whether the addition of any single media source could have a signiﬁcant
impact on the political beliefs of voters. Fox News coverage, however, is unique among the
television media. Fox News is signiﬁcantly to the right of all the other mainstream television
networks (ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC) (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005). The introduction of Fox
News into a cable market, therefore, is likely to have a systematic and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
available political information in that cable market. This is true whether Fox News represents
the political center and the rest of the media the liberal wing, or Fox News represents the right
and the rest of the media the middle.
In order to analyze the impact of Fox News on voting, we assemble a new panel of town-
level data on federal elections and match it with town-level data on cable programming. The
data set covers 28 US states. We compare the change in the Republican vote share between
1996 and 2000 for the towns that had adopted Fox News by 2000 with those that had not.
The availability of Fox News in 2000 appears to be largely idiosyncratic. Conditional on a set
of demographic, geographic, and cable controls, the Fox News and the non-Fox News towns
have indistinguishable voting patterns in 1996 and indistinguishable pre-1996 voting trends.
Our main result is that Fox News had a signiﬁcant impact on the 2000 elections. The
entry of Fox News increased the Republican vote share in presidential elections by 0.4 to 0.7
percentage points, depending on the speciﬁcation. Since Fox News in 2000 was available in
about 35 percent of households, the impact of Fox News on the two-party vote share in 2000 is
estimated to be 0.15 to 0.2 percentage points, 200,000 votes nation-wide. While this vote shift
is small compared to the 3.5 percentage point shift in our sample between 1996 and 2000, it is
still likely to have been decisive in the close presidential 2000 elections.
We consider alternative speciﬁcations and diﬀerent estimation samples, leading to similar
estimates. We implement placebo speciﬁcations; in particular, we show that availability of Fox
News in 2000 did not aﬀect the vote share between 1992 and 1996, when Fox News did not yet
exist. We consider also how the estimates interact with town characteristics. Fox News had
as m a l l e re ﬀect in rural areas, in Republican congressional districts, and in the South. Our
interpretation of these results is that in these towns more people already voted Republican, and
therefore the share of the population at risk of being convinced was smaller. In addition, the
Fox News eﬀect was smaller in towns with more cable channels, consistent with competition
reducing the media eﬀect (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).
We also analyze whether Fox News aﬀected voting in races where Fox News did not cover the
candidates directly, as in most Senate races. This allows us to estimate whether the inﬂuence
of Fox News is candidate-speciﬁc or whether it extends to general political beliefs. We ﬁnd
that Fox News signiﬁcantly increased the Republican vote share for Senate by 0.8 percentage
points. Additionally, the eﬀect is not larger for the one Senatorial race that Fox News covered
heavily, the New York State race between Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio. Fox News appears
to have induced a generalized ideological shift.
2Finally, we consider whether the Fox News eﬀect on Presidential elections was mainly a
result of voters switching party lines, or of additional voter turnout to the polls. We ﬁnd that
Fox News signiﬁcantly increased voter turnout, particularly in the more Democratic districts.
The impact of Fox News on voting appears to be due, at least in part, to the mobilization of
voters, and particularly conservative voters in Democratic-leaning districts.
Overall, we ﬁnd a positive and sizeable impact of Fox News on the vote share for Republi-
cans. This empirical result, however, does not directly quantify the eﬀectiveness of media bias
in altering voting. To estimate the persuasion rate of Fox News, we incorporate information
on the extent of viewership and the share of Republicans in the Fox News audience. Using
Scarborough Research data, we compute the impact on the Fox News audience of availability
of Fox News in local cable programming. These audience estimates imply that Fox News con-
vinced between 3 and 8 percent of its non-Republican listeners to vote Republican. Alternative
audience measures imply persuasion eﬀects of up to 30 percent. Exposure to the conservative
coverage of Fox News, therefore, had a sizeable persuasion eﬀect.
We compare the persuasion rates estimated in our study with the persuasion rates implied
by other studies of media eﬀects on political beliefs or voting.2 First, we consider ﬁeld exper-
iments on voter turnout (Green and Gerber, 2004) and on party choice (Gerber, Karlan, and
Bergan, 2006). The most eﬀective turnout methods–canvassing and phone calling–convince
up to 25 percent of potential voters to turn out. Second, we consider laboratory experiments
involving exposure to 30-second political advertisements (Ansolabehre and Iyengar, 1995). The
advertisements alter voting intentions elicited at the end of the experiment for about 8 percent
of the subjects. Third, we review poll studies. Kull et al. (2003) ﬁnd that Fox News watch-
ers were 50 percent more likely that viewers of other networks to believe (erroneously) that
weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) ﬁnd signiﬁcant
eﬀects on beliefs about 9/11 of exposure to CNN vs. Al Jazeera in the Islamic world. These
surveys imply that media exposure persuades 10 to 15 percent of the audience. While this
overview is by no means exhaustive3, it shows that our estimates of persuasion rates are in the
lower range of most estimates in the literature.
We consider three explanations of our results. The ﬁrst explanation is that the ﬁndings are
spurious and are induced by entry of Fox News in towns that were independently becoming
more conservative. Contrary to this explanation, these towns were no more conservative nor
were they becoming more conservative before the entry of Fox News. A second explanation
is based on rational learning. As the model in Section 2 shows, to the extent that voters are
initially uncertain about the bias of Fox News, exposure will have a (temporary) eﬀect on beliefs
and voting. Voters attribute the positive coverage of Bush in 2000 partly to Republican bias
2Dyck and Zingales (2003) and Huberman and Regev (1999), among others, ﬁnd that media coverage has a
large impact on stock returns, even when arguably it conveys no new information.
3Zaller (1996) summarizes a long-standing literature on null eﬀects of media exposure in surveys.
3of the media source (Fox News) but partly also to high quality of the Republican candidate
(Bush). This prediction relies on the exposure to Fox News between 1996 and 2000 being
too short to precisely estimate the political bias of the media source. This model also makes
the prediction that the media eﬀect should disappear over time. However, the Fox News eﬀect
appears to be permanent, if anything increasing between 2000 and 2004. A third explanation is
that viewers do not discount enough for media bias and are subject to non-rational persuasion.
In this case, exposure to media slant systematically alters beliefs and voting behavior.
The latter interpretation relates to the behavioral literature on over-reliance on the advice
of experts with conﬂict of interest. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) show in an experi-
ment that evaluators of information do not take suﬃciently into account the incentives of the
advisors, even when the incentives are known. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2005) show
that small investors follow the recommendations of aﬃliated analysts, despite the conﬂict of
interest of the analysts.
Our paper contributes to the evidence on shifts in voter turnout following media market
expansion. George and Waldfogel (2004) show that, in areas where New York Times circulation
expanded in the ’90s, voter turnout in local election decreased among likely readers. Gentzkow
(2006) ﬁnds a similarly negative eﬀect of the expansion of television on voter turnout between
1940 and 1972. Stromberg (2004) ﬁnds that entry of the radio increases county-level turnout
between 1920 and 1940. We diﬀer from these studies in that (i) we examine the introduction of
a politically-slanted media, and (ii) we consider the media eﬀects at a ﬁner geographical level,
the town. Like these authors, we ﬁnd some evidence that the arrival of a new information
source impacts voter turnout.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple
model of the eﬀect of media bias on voting. In Section 3 we provide an overview of the cable
industry and of Fox News. In Section 4 we introduce the data and in Section 5 we present
the empirical results. In Section 6 we present estimates of persuasion rates and interpretations
and in Section 7 we conclude.
2M o d e l
We model the impact of media bias on voting in the presence of a new media source. Voting
depends on both ideological preferences a n dp e r c e i v e dp o l i t i c i a nq u a l i t y . W edeﬁne a news
media outlet to be biased if it systematically slants its broadcast of politician quality to favor
either the Republican or the Democratic candidate. We consider both voters who rationally
update from news reports and voters who are subject to non-rational persuasion.
Setup.I ne a c hp e r i o dt, the media reports about a diﬀerent pair of politicians, one Repub-
lican and one Democrat. These can be candidates running against each other in an election,
such as Bush and Gore, or non-elected oﬃcials, such as Rove and McAuliﬀe. While the politi-
4cal aﬃliation of the politicians is known, the ability is unknown and can be guessed only using
the media reports. The true diﬀerential ability of the period-t Republican politician relative
to the period-t Democratic politician is θt, which is i.i.d. and distributed normally with mean
0 and precision γθ: θt ∼ N (0,1/γθ).
The media observes the politician ability θt and broadcasts ψt = θt + β, where β is the
time-invariant degree of media bias, drawn from the distribution N (β0,1/γβ). A media source
with positive β provides a more favorable broadcast of the Republican politician, and the
converse for a media source with negative β. Since the focus of the model is on voter behavior
and not on media strategy, we simplify matters by assuming a reduced-form ‘news production
function’, instead of deriving an optimal bias policy from the utility maximization of the media.
The voters learn about the bias β over time from the sequence of media reports ψt.
After observing the media reports on all the candidates from period 1 to period T, voters
cast their ballots in period T for the candidates that the media covered in period T.T h e
voting is based upon the estimated quality of the period-T candidates, as well as on ideological
preference. A voter casts a ballot for the Republican candidate in period T if b θT +α>0w h e r e
b θT is the voter estimate of the diﬀerential ability of the Republican politician in period T and
α is the ideological preference for the Republican candidate (α can be positive or negative).
Ideological preference α is heterogeneous, with a continuum of voters, c.d.f. F (α), and p.d.f.
f (α) > 0f o ra l lα. (Voters are instead homogeneous in their updating about β and θ)
Signal extraction. The voter faces a signal extraction problem. Upon observing a media
signal ψt, the voter makes inferences with respect to the politician quality θt and the degree
of media bias β. A positive signal ψt could be due to an able Republican candidate, or to a
right-wing media source. After observing T news reports with average report ψT =
PT
t=1 ψt/T,





The estimated bias is a convex combination of the mean bias, β0, and the observed average
report ψT, with weights given by the precision of the prior γβ and the precision of the observed
signal Tγθ. T h em o r es i g n a l s( h i g h e rT) the voter observes, the more weight the voter puts on
the news reports.
Using this estimate of media bias, rational voters estimate the diﬀerential quality of the
period-T Republican candidate ˆ θT. They subtract the estimated bias ˆ βT from the report ψT,
and combine it in a precision-weighted average with the prior about θT, that is, zero (Repub-
lican and Democratic politicians are on average of the same quality). Hence
ˆ θT =
γθ ∗ 0+W[ψT − ˆ βT]
γθ + W
=
W[ψT − ˆ βT]
γθ + W
(2)
4The derivation and the proofs are in Appendix B.
5where W, the precision of ψT − ˆ βT, equals (γβ + Tγθ)
2 /(γβ +( T − 1)γθ).(see Appendix B).
So far, we have considered fully rational updating by voters. We now consider a simple
reduced-form model of voters subject to persuasion. As in DeMarzo et. al. (2003), we interpret
persuasion as incomplete ﬁltering of bias. Voters subject to λ-persuasion believe that the report
ψt equals θt +( 1− λ)β,e v e nt h o u g hi nr e a l i t yt h er e p o r tψT equals θt + β. The parameter
λ ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of persuasion, with λ = 0 nesting the standard model, and
λ = 1 indicating extreme persuasion. These voters systematically underweight the importance
of media bias in inﬂuencing news reports. This is consistent with the experimental ﬁndings
in Cain et al. (2005) in which subjects did not take the bias of the information-provider
suﬃciently into account, even though the bias was common-knowledge. For simplicity, we
assume that the degree of persuasion λ aﬀects neither the estimate of media bias ˆ βT nor the
precision W of ψT − (1 − λ) ˆ βT; therefore, ˆ β and W are not indexed by λ.5 When estimating




W[ψT − (1 − λ) ˆ βT]
γθ + W
. (3)
In Proposition 1, we summarize the eﬀect of media bias β on the estimated ability of the
Republican politician ˆ θλ
T, conditional on the realized politician quality θt,t=1 ,...,T. We
consider the case of voters subject to λ-persuasion, since the standard case is embedded for
λ =0 .
Proposition 1. For any ﬁnite T, (i) an increase in media bias β increases the estimated
quality of the Republican politician, b θλ
T: ∂(b θλ
T)/∂β > 0, and (ii) this increase is higher the
more voters are subject to λ-persuasion: ∂2(b θλ
T)/∂β∂λ > 0. (iii) In the limit as T →∞ ,
the eﬀect of media bias is positive in the case of persuasion (λ>0) and zero otherwise:
limT→∞ ∂(b θλ
T)/∂β = λ.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward. There are two eﬀects of media bias β
on expected politician quality ˆ θλ
T. First, a more right-wing media (higher β) issues a more
positive signal ψT on the T-th Republican politician, which leads to a higher perceived ˆ θλ
T.
Second, a higher β is associated with a higher average of past signals ψT, and therefore to a
higher perceived media bias ˆ βT, l e a d i n gt oal o w e rp e r c e i v e dˆ θλ
T. For ﬁnite T, the ﬁrst, direct
eﬀect dominates the second, indirect eﬀect, and hence media bias has an impact on beliefs:
∂(b θλ
T)/∂β > 0 (Proposition 1.(i)). Moreover, since the degree of persuasion, λ, decreases the
second eﬀect, media bias has a larger impact on beliefs for higher λ (Proposition 1.(ii)).
As T →∞ , the estimated media bias ˆ βT converges to the true bias β. Since eventually the
voters become fully aware of the degree of bias, the media bias has no eﬀect on the expected
perceived quality as long as voters are rational (λ = 0). The same would be true if the bias β
5A model where we relax this simplifying assumption and allow for λ to aﬀect ˆ β and W leads to similar
results, with more complicated expressions.
6were known from the start. Voters that suﬀer from persuasion (λ>0), instead, are aﬀected
by media bias β even after an inﬁnite number of media reports (Proposition 1.(iii)).
Finally, we analyze the impact of media bias on voting, which takes place in period T.A
voter subject to λ-persuasion casts a ballot for the period-T Republican candidate if α+ b θλ
T >
0. Then, the share of votes for the Republican candidate is P(α ≥− b θλ
T)=1− F(−b θλ
T),
an increasing function of the estimated (diﬀerential) ability b θλ
T of the Republican candidate.
Proposition 2 summarizes the eﬀect of media bias β on the vote share 1 − F(−b θλ
T).
Proposition 2. (i) For any ﬁnite T, an increase in media bias β increases the Republican
vote share 1−F(−b θλ
T): ∂[1−F(−b θλ
T)]/∂β > 0. (ii) In the limit as T →∞ , the eﬀect of media
bias is positive in the case of persuasion (λ>0) and is zero otherwise.
The impact of media bias on voting follows in a straightforward manner from its impact
on beliefs. A new media source can temporarily move voters in the direction of its bias even
if voters are rational (Proposition 2.(i)); in the long run, however, only voters subject to
persuasion remain aﬀected (Proposition 2.(ii)). Proposition 1.(ii) does not generalize to voting
without restrictions on the shape of the distribution of voters F. While a higher λ increases
t h ei m p a c to fβ on the estimated politician quality b θλ
T, it does not necessarily increase the
impact on the vote share 1−F(−b θλ
T) if the elasticity of voting with respect to beliefs, captured
in f, is lower for individuals with higher λ.
The empirical predictions of the model depend on the length of the experience of the
audience with Fox News by 2000. Since Fox News was started in 1996, by the year 2000 its
audience had the chance to experience its coverage of several politicians, from Clinton and
Dole, to Ted Kennedy and John McCain, to Gore and Bush. The viewers were also exposed to
Fox News’ reporting on non-elected political ﬁgures such as Ken Starr or Jesse Jackson. To the
extent that each pair of politicians is an observation t, therefore, one reasonable assumption
is that by the 2000 elections the audience had a precise estimate of the Fox News bias (case
T →∞ ). In this case, only voters subject to persuasion should be aﬀected by the exposure to
Fox News. Fox News should not impact rational voters.
Ad i ﬀerent interpretation holds that, instead, four years are too short a period for the
audience to form a clear opinion of the Fox News bias, especially since some of the audience
listened to it for only a year or two before 2000. In this case, Fox News should aﬀect voting on
Bush and Gore also for rational voters. The impact should diminish over time, between 2000
and the subsequent elections, and should be stronger if voters suﬀer from persuasion.
3 Cable Industry and Fox News
Cable industry. The cable industry is a local natural monopoly. Once one company has
paid the ﬁxed cost to lay the cables in a town, it is uncommon for a second company to pay
7the ﬁxed cost as well and enter the local market. In our sample, only ten percent of towns
have two competing cable companies, and only one percent have three or more companies.
A second important feature of the cable industry is the technological constraint on the num-
ber of channels. Established channels like CNN are oﬀered in almost all towns. New channels
like Fox News have to convince local cable companies to be added, often at the expense of other
channels. This generates substantial variation across towns in the programming provided.
Local cable service providers (henceforth local cable companies) pay a monthly fee, typically
between 10 cents and 40 cents per user, to the networks that they carry. They also pay fees
to towns that grant them the right to broadcast. These fees are typically set as part of a
10- to 15-year contract with the town. Finally, local cable companies get their revenue from
their monthly subscriber fees. The amount of the subscriber fee is partly regulated and varies
between $10 and $60, depending on the company, the location, and on the tier of service.
Fox News history. In March of 1996, Rupert Murdoch, CEO of News Corp., announced
the introduction of a 24-hour-a-day cable news channel. The new channel, Fox News Channel
(“Fox News” from here on), was created to compete with CNN. Prior to the launch of Fox News,
news broadcasts took up a small share of programming of the Fox Broadcasting Corporation,
which included channels like Fox Sports, Fox Entertainment, and Fox Family Channel. There
was no broadcast news at a national level, and prime time programming on the various Fox
channels did not include news. The main television sources for news before 1996 were the three
major networks–ABC, CBS, and NBC–, in addition to CNN, distributed via cable.
The distribution of Fox News started on October 7, 1996 in a limited number of cable mar-
kets. To facilitate the spread of the new channel, the Fox Network oﬀered a one-time payment
of $10 per subscriber to cable companies that included Fox News in their programming. TCI
was one of the ﬁrst companies to sign a contract with Fox News. After the initial contract was
signed, the local aﬃliates decided whether to include Fox News among the channels transmit-
ted. The timing of the agreement is one factor inducing idiosyncratic diﬀusion of Fox News.
By November 2000, AT&T Broadband, which acquired TCI Cable in 1999, oﬀered Fox News
in 32.5 percent of the 1,955 towns served by its aﬃliates (in our sample of 28 US States).
Adelphia Communications, which had a late agreement with Fox News, oﬀered Fox News in
only 7.5 percent of the 1,592 towns in our sample served by its aﬃliates.
In addition to 24-hour cable programming, Fox News distributes short news segments to
local TV stations that are aﬃliates of Fox Broadcasting. However, the complete programming
of Fox News is only available via cable and to 12 million satellite subscribers (in 2000).6
By the year 2000, Fox News was present in 20 percent of towns in our sample with cable
service. Since the towns reached by Fox News in 2000 were more than twice as large as the
6As of June 2000, 14,458,000 US households subscribe to a satellite service, but 2 million of these
subscribers do not receive Fox News (Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, from
http://www.sbca.com/index.asp).
8remaining towns, Fox News was available to 34.3 percent of the population of these states.
Fox News content and programming. A key feature of Fox News is the diﬀerentiation
in its political coverage relative to CNN and the network news stations. Groseclose and Milyo
(2005) use data on citations of think-tanks between 1997 and 2003 to rank the political ori-
entation of news programs from diﬀerent media sources. In particular, they impute an ADA
score for the news program based on the ADA score of the members of Congress that refer to
t h es a m et h i n k - t a n k s . 7 Their estimation results assign an imputed ADA score for Fox News
Special Report of 39.7. This score is signiﬁcantly lower than the score for any of the other
mainstream television media (ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC), with scores between 56.0 (CNN
NewsNight)a n d7 3 . 7( C B SEvening News). The news coverage of Fox News is estimated to be
signiﬁcantly more conservative than all other TV news channels. Moreover, Fox News coverage
is estimated to be to the right of the average US elected oﬃcial, which has a score of 50.1.
This study may, if anything, underestimate the political diﬀerentiation of Fox News. The
two Fox News shows with the highest ratings, The O’Reilly Factor and Hannity & Colmes,a r e
likely more conservative than the Special Report, which Groseclose and Milyo use to estimate
the ADA citations. Both shows aired since the beginning of Fox News.
Fox News Audience. We document the Fox News penetration and the political and
demographic composition of its audience using micro-level data from Scarborough Research.
Scarborough collects demographic variables and two measures of audience from a representative
panel of households8. The ‘regular audience’ of a given TV channel is the share of respondents
who answer yes to a question on whether or not they listened regularly to the channel in the
three months prior to the survey. The ‘diary audience’ measure is tabulated from a week-long
diary of TV watching in half-an-hour intervals. The diary audience for a channel is the share
of respondents who watched it for at least one full half-an-hour block in the survey week.
In Column 1 of Table 1 we report summary statistics for the 105,201 respondents to the
August 2000-March 2001 survey. The regular audience for Fox News is 17.3 percent, and 34.1
percent for CNN. According to this measure, by the year 2000, Fox News already had an
audience half as large as that of CNN. The diary audience is not available for this sample.
In Table 1, we also present other summary statistics for the overall sample (Column 1), for
the regular Fox News audience (Column 2), and for the rest of the sample (Column 3). The
regular Fox News audience is signiﬁcantly more likely to also watch CNN regularly, probably
reﬂecting a taste for television news. The education level and unemployment rate are compa-
7The ADA score is a measure of political orientation created by Americans for Democratic Action.
8In an earlier version of the paper we used a June 2000 Pew Survey to estimate the determinants of the Fox
News audience, with diﬀerent results: in that sample, the Fox News audience does not appear to be selected on
political variables, while it is heavily selected on low education. The Scarborough data has several advantages
over the Pew Survey, including a substantially larger sample, zip-code identiﬁers for part of the sample, and a
more precise measure of audience. We believe that at least part of the the diﬀerences between Scarborough and
Pew data is due to confusion between the Fox News Channel and the Fox aﬃliates in the Pew survey.
9rable across the two samples, African Americans are somewhat more likely to listen regularly
to Fox News, and Hispanics somewhat less likely. The Fox News audience is older (49.7 vs.
44.8 years) and more likely to be male (48.1 vs. 41.2 percent).
Turning to the political variables, 37.5 percent of the regular Fox News audience self-identify
as Republican, 29.4 percent as Democrat, and the remainder as Independent. Among the non-
Fox News audience, 26.2 percent identify as Republican and 32.4 percent as Democrat. Fox
News listeners therefore are more likely to be Republican. Since the audience data is from
2000, after the entry of Fox News, this diﬀerence could be due either to sorting of Republicans
into the Fox News audience, or to a persuasion eﬀect of exposure to Fox News. Self-reported
turnout also diﬀers: 76.9 percent of the Fox News audience state that they always vote in
Presidential elections, compared to 67.7 in the complementary group.
As for the media variables, 68.7 percent of the whole sample report having cable, while
only 14.7 percent report having access to satellite television. The share with cable is higher
for the regular Fox News audience, while the share with satellite does not vary.
In Columns 4-6 we focus on the subsample for which ZIP code of residence and the diary
audience measure are both available. This sample was recorded between February 2000 and
August 2001 in ﬁve geographical areas9. We further restrict the sample to the 11,388 respon-
dents living in one of the 568 towns with available cable and election data. In Section 6.1, we
use this sub-sample to estimate the impact of Fox News availability via cable on the likelihood
of being a Fox News viewer. In this sample (Column 4), the measure of the regular Fox News
audience (16.6) is slightly lower than in the sample as a whole (Column 1); the demograph-
ics are comparable across the two samples, with the exception of a higher share of Hispanic
viewers. The diary audience is 3 to 5 times smaller than the corresponding regular audience:
The Fox News diary audience measure is .035. compared to a regular audience measure of
.166. Similarly, the CNN measure of diary audience is .103, compared to a regular audience
of .353. The diary audience is likely to understate the real audience, since it excludes anyone
who watched less television than usual during the survey week, anyone who watched a channel
repeatedly but either never watched a full half hour block, or anyone who watched it but failed
to report it. The regular audience measure is immune to these issues, since it covers a longer
time period, the quarter, but it has the disadvantage of subjectivity.
In Columns 5 and 6 we compare the Fox News audience and the non-Fox News audience
according to the diary measure. The diﬀerences between these two samples resemble the ones
found according to the regular audience measures (Columns 2 and 3), except that political
diﬀerences are more accentuated and that African Americans are less likely to watch Fox News
according to the diary measure.
9The data includes respondents residing in the DMAs of Chicago (September 2000-August 2001), Los Angeles
(February 2000-January 2001), Pittsburgh (September 2000-August 2001), New York (March 2000-February
2001), and Washington (March 2000-February 2001).
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Cable data. We obtained the cable data from a paper copy of the Television and Cable
Factbook, 2001 edition (Warren, 2001). This edition contains information on all local cable
companies as of November 2000, that is, right up to the 2000 elections. We did not collect
information for the year 1996, since Fox News became available only in October 1996 and just
for a limited number of markets. Each local cable company serves up to 100 communities in
the neighboring region, all listed in the entry. All companies oﬀer a basic service package,
and over a half also oﬀer up to three expanded basic service packages. The basic service
programming typically includes channels such as C-Span and the ABC Family Channel. In
addition, these companies are required by law to broadcast local television stations as part of
their basic service. Expanded basic service, when available, includes channels such as Comedy
Central and Fox Sports for an additional fee. Finally, cable companies sometimes oﬀer ` al a
carte channels such as HBO for a fee. In Appendix A we present further details on the data.
For the 28 states for which we were able to obtain town-level election data (Appendix Table
1), we collected, for each local cable company, data on the communities served, as well as an
estimate of the total number of channels (excluding the local TV channels) oﬀered. We also
recorded whether CNN and Fox News were included and, if so, as part of which contract (Basic
or Expanded Basic). Overall, this data set covers 17,333 communities in 28 States. (Column
1 in Appendix Table 1). The states with the largest number of communities are California
(1,110), Michigan (1,373), New York (1,465), Ohio (1,873), and especially Pennsylvania (2,667).
Election data. The main sources of election data are the Federal Election Project (Lublin
and Voss, 2001) for the year 2000, the Record of American Democracy (ROAD) Project (King
et al., 1997) for the year 1988, and the Atlas Election data (Leip, 2004) for the 2004 Presidential
election. For most other years we obtained the information from the Election Division of the
Secretary of State of each state.
Since the unit of observation for the cable data is the town, we have constructed a data set
of voting information at the town level. The data collection diﬀers depending on the state. A
ﬁrst group of states–California, New Jersey, New York, and the New England States–directly
provide voting information at the town level, which we employ. A second group of states–
Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming–provide
precinct-level voting information with the town name explicitly speciﬁed for each precinct; in
this case, we aggregate the voting information to the town level. Finally, a third group of
states–Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia–only have precinct-level voting information, with precinct
names that usually include the name of the town, but sometimes do not. Examples of precinct
names are “02 - Concord Elem School” and “Hot Springs Retirement Hm”. For these states,
we recover the town name from the precinct name by elimination of numbers and commonly
11used words, such as “School” and “Retirement Hm”10. We then aggregate the voting data over
precincts with the same town name in a given county and state.11 T h et w e n t y - e i g h tU Ss t a t e s
that have voting information available for both years 1996 and 2000 form the sample used in
this paper. The remaining states either do not have electronic voting information available at
levels of aggregation below the county level, or have numeric precincts with no precinct-to-town
conversion available from the state. The aggregation procedure generates 26,710 distinct local-
ities (Columns 3 and 5 in Appendix Table 1). States like Alabama, Arkansas, and Tennessee
have a very large number of localities because precinct names are often incorrectly identiﬁed
as a locality by our code. (These ﬁctitious towns drop out from the ﬁnal sample, since they
do not match to Census and election data.) Conversely, the New England states have a small
number of exactly-identiﬁed towns because the election data is reported at the town level.
Census data. For the 28 US states in our sample, we collect information on town-level
demographics from the 1990 Census and the 2000 Census. More precisely, we use data at the
level of “Place”, including “Remainders of Place”. In order to match the Census data with
the election and cable data, we transform the place name and aggregate the Census data using
the same code employed for the election and cable data. This procedure leaves 27,064 places
with information from both the 2000 and the 1990 Census. The average population for these
places (Column 7 in Appendix Table 1) varies from 719 in Alaska to 24,070 in California.
Matched data. We match the cable, the election, and the Census data by state, county,
and place name. The match between the cable data and the election data reduces the sample
to 10,479 localities. We then drop 353 localities that fail to match to the Census data. We
also drop 289 towns with multiple cable systems, at least one of which carries Fox News and
at least one of which does not. For these towns, we do not know if cable consumers have
access to Fox News. Additionally, we drop 324 towns with cable systems that do not oﬀer
CNN as part of the cable package. In these towns, cable oﬀerings are typically limited to the
re-programming of local cable channels. Their news programming, therefore, is not comparable
to the programming of the other towns.12 Finally, we drop 257 towns with likely voting data
problems: 238 towns for which the number of precincts generating the town-level vote count
diﬀers by more than 20 percent between 1996 and 200013; and 19 towns for which the total
number of votes cast in the Presidential election diﬀers by more than 100 percent between
1996 and 2000. For these observations, the problems are likely due to imperfect matching of
the precincts aggregated to the town level in 1996 and 2000.
The ﬁnal sample includes 9,256 towns. The states with the largest number of observations
10The Stata ado ﬁle that translates precinct names into town names is available upon request.
11We drop precincts such as ”Precinct 1” where the transformation algorythm leads to an empty name.
12The results do not vary if we include these towns.
13We do not apply this criterion for Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Utah,
since the numbering of precincts is not comparable across 1996 and 2000.
12(Column 2 of Appendix Table 1) are Pennsylvania (1,716), Michigan (930), and Ohio (904),
three of the largest States. The Census regions with the greatest number of towns are the
Northeast (4,030 towns) and the Midwest (3,812 towns), followed by the South (725 towns)
and the West (689 towns). Figure 1 shows the distribution of observations by county. In the
majority of the 1,166 counties in the sample, no town oﬀe r sF o xN e w s .T h i si sn o ts u r p r i s i n g
given that Fox News is available in only 20 percent of towns and many counties have few towns.
Very few counties have Fox News available in all towns. The remaining 290 counties, in which
a fraction of the towns oﬀers Fox News, are spread widely over the 28 states.
The towns in the ﬁnal sample cover 65.9 percent of the population of the 28 States in the
year 2000 (Column 11 of Appendix Table 1). The corresponding ﬁgure for the voting data is
68.6 percent for the year 2000 (Column 9) and 70.4 percent for the year 1996 (Column 10). The
coverage rate is lower than 100 percent for three reasons: (i) we drop from the sample some of
the largest cities like New York which have several cable systems, only some of which carry Fox
News, and some of which do not, (ii) in states like Missouri, Utah, and Virginia, some of the
counties have numeric precinct names that we cannot match to a town, and (iii) in states like
Arkansas and Alabama, complicated precinct names induce a poor match between the election
data and the cable and Census data. The exclusion of large cities or certain counties and the
presence of States with a large non-matching rate should not aﬀect the results, as long as Fox
News availability and the election outcomes are measured correctly for the matching towns.
The ﬁnal sample has comparable Fox News availability relative to the initial sample (Columns
1 and 2), and somewhat lower Republican vote share in 2000 and 1996 (Columns 3 through
6) because the unmatched towns are more likely to be small and rural. Except for average
population, which is substantially higher in the ﬁnal sample (Columns 7 and 8), the towns in
the ﬁnal sample are fairly comparable to the towns in the initial sample.
Variables. The indicator dFOX
k,2000 equals one if all cable systems in town k in year 2000
include Fox News in either the Basic package or one of the Expanded Basic packages, and zero
if no cable system includes Fox News. According to this measure, 20 percent of towns oﬀer Fox
News (Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 1). In most states, the percentage varies between
10 and 30 percent, indicating substantial within-state variation in Fox News availability.
Appendix Table 1 also presents information on the voting data. For each town k in year
t we denote the number of votes cast for the Republican candidate in race j (j =P r e s . ,
Sen.) as V
R,j
k,t . Similarly, we denote the votes cast for the Democratic candidate as V
D,j
k,t
and the votes cast for other parties as V
O,j



































k,t ), where Ref. denotes the Reform party and Green
denotes the Green Party. These variables are set to missing if the number of votes for either
the Republican or the Democratic candidate is zero, usually reﬂecting an incumbent running
13unchallenged. Over the ﬁnal sample, the average two-party Republican vote share is .470 in
the year 1996 (Column 6) and .538 in the year 2000 (Column 4). These unweighted averages
are higher than the population-weighted average. Our main measure of turnout t
j
k,t in town k
for year t and race j is the log of the total votes cast: t
j
k,t =l n ( V
TOT,j
k,t ). The change in t
j
k,t
over time is the percent change in total votes. In the turnout speciﬁcations, we also control
for the log of voting-age population ln(Popk,t). As an alternative measure, we use the the log
of votes cast as a share of voting age population, t
j0





Column 1 of Table 2 presents unweighted summary statistics on the 9,256 towns in our sample.
In the year 2000, the average cable system included over 28 channels in the Basic and Expanded
Basic programming. The mean total population reached by a cable system was 78,124, with
a median of 23,921. The mean town population was 9,612 people, with a median of 2,766. As
Census controls, we include in our regressions the share of the population with some college, the
share of college graduates, the share of African Americans and of Hispanics, the unemployment
rate, and the share of the town that is urban (shown in Table 1). In addition, we include the
share of high school graduates, the share of males, the marriage rate, the employment and
the unemployment rate, average income, and the share of the population living in an urban
area (not shown in Table 1). These controls are present both in their 2000 value, and in
changes between 1990 and 2000. Finally, the political variables are the two-party vote share
for Republicans in Presidential elections (1996 and 2000) and the total turnout in Presidential
elections measured as log share of the voting-age population, t
j0
k,t (1996 and 2000).
Columns 2 and 3 compare towns that oﬀered Fox News in their programming (Column
2) and towns that did not (Column 3). Towns that oﬀer Fox News have a substantially
higher number of channels oﬀered (44.5 versus 24.7), are 25 percent larger, are served by cable
companies that reach three times as many people, and are more likely to be urban.
More importantly, towns that oﬀered Fox News by 2000 increased their Republican vote
share by 5.9 percentage points (from 47.9 percent to 53.8 percent) between 1996 and 2000, while
t h o s et h a td i dn o to ﬀer Fox News increased theirs by an even larger 7.1 percentage points (from
46.7 percent to 53.8 percent). These ﬁgures suggest a perverse Fox News eﬀect. This result,
however, does not weight towns by size, nor does it take into account diﬀerences between Fox
and non-Fox towns in voting trends across geographical areas, demographic composition, and
cable market. Below, we estimate the Fox News eﬀect taking into account all these factors.
The overall sample spans 235 congressional districts, out of 435 total14. Out of these 235
14For the towns that are in multiple districts, we code the town as belonging to the district where the largest
14districts, 152 districts include both towns that oﬀered Fox News and towns that did not. In
our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation with district ﬁxed eﬀects, the eﬀect of Fox News is
estimated on these districts. The median district in this subsample of 7,631 towns oﬀers Fox
News in 20.4 percent of towns (Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2). Towns in this subsample are
smaller but otherwise comparable to the overall sample.
We also consider the distribution of Fox News at the ﬁner geographical level of the county.
Only 284 counties out of 1,156 incorporate both towns with Fox News and towns without.
These counties are more concentrated in the Northeast and less in the South (Figure 1). In
our speciﬁcation with county ﬁxed eﬀects, the eﬀect of Fox News is estimated on the 3,890
towns in these counties. The median county in this subsample oﬀers Fox News in 40.4 percent
of towns. Towns with Fox News (Column 6 of Table 2) and without Fox News (Column 7)
in this subsample are close geographical neighbors and therefore more closely matched on
observables, such as demographic and voting characteristics.
5.2 Selection
The identiﬁcation in this paper relies on comparing towns with Fox News in their programming
in the year 2000 to towns without Fox News. Since the assignment of towns into these two
groups is not random, we investigate the nature of the selection. Fox News may well have
expanded ﬁrst in more Republican areas, since demand for its services is likely to be higher in
these areas. If Republican areas were becoming more Republican between 1996 and 2000, the
estimated Fox News eﬀect may just be capturing political trends.
To investigate this and other forms of selection, we estimate which town-level variables
predict the availability of Fox News in 2000. In particular, we include the Republican vote
share in presidential elections in 1996 (that is, pre-Fox News), v
R,Pres
k,1996. We estimate a linear
probability model15:
dFOX
k,2000 = α + βv
R,Pres
k,1996 + Γ2000Xk,2000 + Γ00−90Xk,00−90 + ΓCCk,2000 + εk, (4)
where Xk,2000 is the set of controls from the 2000 Census, and Xk,2000−1990 is the set of changes
in controls between the 1990 Census and the 2000 Census (see Table 2). In addition to the
demographic variables, we control for features of the cable system by including Ck,2000, deciles
in the number of channels provided and in the number of potential subscribers. Since the
precision of the vote share variable v
R,Pres
k,1996 is increasing in the total number of votes cast, we
weight the observations by the average of the total votes cast in 1996 and in 200016.T h e
fraction of the town’s population is represented.
15T h er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a rw i t hl o g it and conditional logit speciﬁcations.
16The results are essentially identical if we weight by votes cast in 1996, or by votes cast in 2000. Weighting
by the average reduces the potential eﬀect of measurement error in the total votes cast.
15standard errors are clustered at the level of the local cable company. There are 2,992 local
cable companies in the sample, giving an average of 3.09 observations per cluster.
We ﬁrst estimate (4) with demographic controls and without cable controls (ΓC =0 )
(Column 1 of Table 3). In this speciﬁcation, Fox News availability in 2000 is substantially
higher in more Republican towns: a 10 percentage point increase in Republican vote share
is associated with a 6.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of Fox News availability.
Urban towns and more highly educated towns are more likely to have Fox News by the year
2000. While these demographic variables are signiﬁcant, they predict a relatively small share of
the variance, with an R2 of .0772. In Column 2, we add the non-parametric controls Ck,2000 for
potential subscribers in the cable system and for number of channels. The additional variables
raise the R2 to .4032. Larger cable systems are much more likely to oﬀer Fox News. The
introduction of the cable controls lowers the coeﬃcient ˆ β on the Republican vote share by half.
In Column 3, we add congressional district ﬁxed eﬀects to control for some of the geographic
heterogeneity in Fox News penetration. With these additional geographic controls, speciﬁcation
(4) captures the determinants of within-district Fox News availability. In this speciﬁcation,
there is no evidence that towns with higher Republican vote share are more likely to oﬀer Fox
News: in fact, the estimated ˆ β = −.0324 is negative, albeit insigniﬁcant. Given the precision
of the estimates, we can reject substantial eﬀects of pre-existing political composition on the
availability of Fox News. Moreover, none of 14 demographic controls is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. This suggests that, once we control for geographic heterogeneity and size of the cable
system, availability of Fox News in 2000 is idiosyncratic. We obtain similar results when we
introduce county ﬁxed eﬀects instead of congressional district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 4).
In Column 5, we replicate the speciﬁcation in Column 3 with the addition of tPres0
k,1996, voter
turnout in the 1996 Presidential election measured by log of votes cast as share of population.
As with the case of the Republican vote share, voter turnout in 1996 is uncorrelated with the
availability of Fox News in 2000. Finally, in Columns 6 and 7 we test whether voting trends
predict the availability of Fox News. We add the change in the Republican vote share in
Presidential elections between 1988 and 1992 to the speciﬁcations in Columns 3 and 4. Since
town-level data for 1992 is hard to ﬁnd, this reduces the sample to 3,722 towns. The time
trend variable is not signiﬁcant and switches sign between the two speciﬁcations.
Overall, the strongest determinant of the availability of Fox News in 2000 is the presence
of a cable system with a large number of channels. Once we control for cable size and for
geographical heterogeneity, the presence of Fox News in 2000 appears to be idiosyncratic. Fox
News availability is not systematically related to demographics at the town level. Further, it
is orthogonal to both the Republican vote share and voter turnout in the 1996 Presidential
elections. Finally, it is also unrelated to the time trends in voting between 1988 and 1992.
165.3 Presidential elections
The baseline empirical speciﬁcation is a standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation. We com-
pare towns where Fox News entered the cable market by the year 2000 with towns where Fox
News was not available by the year 2000. We consider the impact of the entry of Fox News on
the change in the Republican vote share between 1996 and 2000. This strategy exploits the
timing of the entry of Fox News. By the November 1996 elections, Fox News had been launched
in only a few markets, and, even in those markets, just one month before the elections. By
the November 2000 elections, Fox News had an audience that was smaller, but nonetheless





k,1996 = α + βFdFOX
k,2000 + Γ2000Xk,2000 + Γ00−90Xk,00−90 + ΓCCk,2000 + εk. (5)
As in Table 3, we control for town-level demographics from the 2000 Census (Xk,2000), changes
in demographics between the 1990 and the 2000 Census (Xk,00−90), and cable-level controls
(Ck,2000). The observation are weighted by the average of votes cast in 1996 and in 2000, and
the standard errors are clustered at the level of the local cable company.
We ﬁrst implement a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator and estimate (5) without
controls (Γ2000 = Γ00−90 =0a n dΓC = 0) (Column 1 in Table 4). On average, in our sample
the vote share for Republicans increased by 3.47 percentage points (ˆ α = .0347) between the
1996 and the 2000 elections. Compared to this overall increase, towns with Fox News became
(insigniﬁcantly) less Republican by two tenths of a percentage point (ˆ βF = −.0026) relative
to towns without Fox News. The standard error (.0037), however, is suﬃciently large that
we cannot rule out that the entry of Fox News increased the Republican vote share by half a
percentage point. In Column 2, we add demographic controls, raising the R2 of the regression
from .0008 to .5199. The estimate for βF, ˆ βF = .0027, becomes positive, but is still insigniﬁcant.
The change in vote share for Republicans is more positive in towns with fewer college graduates,
fewer blacks and Hispanics, and higher unemployment in 2000. The change in vote share is
also positively correlated with decreases in the number of blacks and decreases in the number
of unemployed workers between 1990 and 2000. In Column 3, we add controls for cable size
Ck,2000, rendering the Fox News coeﬃcient positive and signiﬁcant (ˆ βF = .0078). Controlling
for population, a higher number of potential cable subscribers is negatively correlated with
the Republican vote share. Introducing control variables increases the point estimate of βF,
suggesting that the unobservables bias the estimate of the Fox News eﬀect downward.
In the two benchmark speciﬁcations we include district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 4) and county
ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 5) in addition to the full set of controls. In these speciﬁcations the iden-
tiﬁcation of βF depends on the comparison of neighboring towns with and without Fox News.
These speciﬁcations control for unobserved trends in voting that are common to a geographic
area, and that may be correlated with Fox News availability. In Column 4, the comparison of
neighboring towns takes place within a congressional district, while in Column 5 it takes place
17within the ﬁner geographical unit of the county. The key advantage of speciﬁcations with cable,
demographic, and geographic controls is that, conditional on these variables, the availability
of Fox News is idiosyncratic (Table 3). The estimate of the eﬀect of Fox News is positive and
signiﬁcant in both cases, .0040 and .0069 respectively. In both speciﬁcations, the standard
errors on the coeﬃcient βF are halved compared to Column 1, indicating that the additional
controls increase substantially the precision of the estimates. In the speciﬁcations that best
control for heterogeneity, availability of Fox News increases the Republican vote share by 4 to
7 tenths of a percentage point, a sizeable and precisely estimated eﬀect.
In Columns 6 and 7, we replicate the results of Columns 4 and 5 after adding the change
in Republican vote share between 1988 and 1992 as an additional control. Over this substan-
tially smaller sample (3,722 observations), the eﬀect of Fox News availability is less precisely
estimated and somewhat smaller, but still signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation with county ﬁxed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on 1988-1992 voting trends is close to zero with district ﬁxed eﬀects
and signiﬁcant but small with county ﬁxed eﬀects. Since previous voting trends are not sub-
stantial predictors of current voting trends, and since including them would lower the sample
size substantially, we omit them in the remaining regressions.
Robustness. In Table 5, we examine the robustness of these results to a number of
alternative assumptions. Throughout, we use the full set of controls as well as ﬁxed eﬀects for
congressional districts, as in Column 4 of Table 417. First, we test for robustness to functional
form assumptions. In Column 1, we regress the vote share in 2000, v
R,Pres
k,2000, on the vote share
in 1996, v
R,Pres
k,1996, instead of taking their diﬀerence. The coeﬃcient on the 1996 vote share is




k,1996 in the benchmark
speciﬁcations18. In Column 2, we allow for a non-linear relationship between the 1996 and 2000
vote shares, and regress v
R,Pres
k,2000 on a quartic polynomial of v
R,Pres
k,1996. In Column 3, we use as an





In all three speciﬁcations, the estimate for ˆ βF is positive and signiﬁcant and very similar to
the benchmark estimate with district ﬁxed eﬀects. In particular, the estimate of a .85 percent
eﬀect (ˆ β = .0085) in Column 3 is consistent with the benchmark estimate (Table 4, Column
4) of .4 percentage points, given an average Republican vote share of around .5.
In the next set of speciﬁcations, we consider alternative speciﬁcations which take into
account the role of third parties, that is, Ross Perot in 1996 and, to a lesser extent, Ralph
Nader in 2000. To the extent that towns with Fox News in 2000 may be more informed
about third party candidates, neglecting third parties could lead to a bias in the estimates.











k,t ) (Column 4) and the right-wing-party vote share
17The results are similar if we instead include county ﬁxed eﬀe c t s ,a si nC o l u m n5o fT a b l e4 .
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k,t ) (Column 5). Across
these speciﬁcations, the estimate for ˆ βF is positive and signiﬁcant and hovers around 4 tenths
of a percentage point, as in the benchmark speciﬁcation with district ﬁxed eﬀects.
Next, we consider alternative speciﬁc a t i o n so ft h eF o xN e w sv a r i a b l edFOX
k,2000.E x p o s u r e
t oF o xN e w si sl i k e l yt ob eh i g h e rf o rt o w n si nw h i c hF o xN e w si sp r o v i d e da sp a r to ft h e
Basic cable package, rather than as part of the (more expensive) Expanded package. We
add a dummy for towns with Fox News in the Basic package (Column 6). The estimated
coeﬃcient on this dummy is positive but insigniﬁcant. The lack of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
likely reﬂects the near equivalence between availability in a Basic or Extended package: two
thirds of Basic subscribers purchase the Extended package whenever available. While this
speciﬁcation accounts for diﬀerences in exposure to diﬀerent packages, it does not account for
variation across towns in subscription rates to cable. To account for this, we compute rk,t,
the ratio of the number of Fox News subscribers to the number of potential subscribers. This
ratio is zero for towns that do not oﬀer Fox News.19 The coeﬃcient on this ratio (Column 7),
.0058, is positive and marginally signiﬁcant. The lower precision in this estimate may be due
to measurement error in the subscriber data, which is updated less frequently.
We also test the sensitivity of the results to alternative samples. To check the robustness to
the weighting procedure, we run an unweighted regression restricted to the 3,115 towns with
average turnout in 1996 and 2000 of at least 2000 votes (Column 8). To examine the potential
impact of outliers, we trim the top and bottom 1 percent of the dependent variable (Column
9). In both of these speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of Fox News is positive and signiﬁcant.
Finally, we adopt the optimal trimming approach of Crump et al. (2005) (Column 10).
This approach acknowledges that treatment and control group often diﬀer signiﬁcantly on
observables, making the interpretation of average treatment eﬀects problematic. As a solution,
it focuses the analysis on an optimal subsample in which treatment and control observations
are more comparable. We implement this method by estimating a propensity score for the
availability of Fox News based on the controls v
R,Pres
k,1996,X k,2000, Xk,00−90,a n dCk,2000.W et h e n
eliminate the 5,079 observations with propensity score smaller than .1 or larger than .9, the
cutoﬀs suggested by Crump et al. (2005). The trimming eliminates most towns with fewer than
20 cable channels, since Fox News is almost never included as one of these channels. To the
extent that cable companies in these towns under-report their oﬀering, including potentially
Fox News, their exclusion eliminates a source of contamination of the control group. Over the
optimally trimmed sample of 4,177 towns, the point estimate for ˆ βF is signiﬁcant and larger
than in the baseline speciﬁcation, consistently with attenuation over the eliminated sample.
We use this subsample in the rest of the paper as a speciﬁcation check.
In Appendix Table 2, we explore the role of weighting and of measurement error. The
estimates of the Fox News eﬀect are very similar if we weight the observations by voting-age
19Since subscription information is missing for some towns, 42 towns drop out from this regression.
19population in 1996 (Columns 1 and 2) instead of by total votes cast. The estimates are .25
percentage points lower (.0014 and .0040) if we do not weight (Columns 3 and 4). The Fox
News eﬀect is still signiﬁcant with county ﬁxed eﬀects but not with district ﬁxed eﬀects. The
lower point estimates may be due to higher measurement error in very small towns or to
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects in smaller, more rural towns (see Table 6). We also present
the results of another unweighted estimation procedure, nearest-neighbor matching (Abadie et
al., 2001). Each town with Fox News (treatment town) is matched to the non-Fox News town
(control town) with the closest value of the controls. We match observations based on cable
and Census controls (Column 5), and also on District indicator variables (Column 6).20 The
average treatment eﬀect of Fox News (.0054 and .0042) is similar to our benchmark ﬁndings,
signiﬁcant, and larger than the OLS estimates without weighting (Columns 3 and 4). Diﬀerent
weighting procedures, therefore, have only a limited eﬀect on the results.
In Columns 7 and 8 we enlarge the baseline sample by including observations that are likely
to be subject to greater measurement error. We include (as treated) 289 towns where Fox News
is oﬀered in parts but not all of the town, and 257 towns with likely voting data problems (see
Section 4 for details). Consistently with increased measurement error in the Fox News variable,
the estimates of the Fox News eﬀect are lower. Finally, in Columns 9 and 10 we present a
speciﬁcation that is both unweighted and includes the observations with measurement error;
in addition, we exclude the data from the states of Hi, Nd, Nj, and Wy. This speciﬁcation is
essentially the one that appeared in an older version of this paper. The failure to reject the
null hypothesis stems from the inclusion of observations with greater measurement error, the
equal weighting of towns of diﬀerent sizes, and the smaller sample of States.
Interaction eﬀects. In Table 6, we examine how the Fox News eﬀect interacts with town
characteristics for the benchmark speciﬁcations with district and county ﬁxed eﬀects (Columns
1-2 and 5-6) and in the optimally trimmed sample (Columns 3-4 and 7-8). The impact of Fox
News is larger in urban towns, although this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in the optimally trimmed
sample. This result may simply reﬂect the fact (documented below) that the Fox News eﬀect
is larger in more Democratic towns, which tend to be more urban.
The Fox News eﬀect is smaller in towns with more cable channels: an increase of 10 cable
channels (.7 standard deviations) reduces the eﬀect by .2 percentage points. When the Fox
News message competes with a larger number of channels, its impact appears diminished
(Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). The lower Fox News impact result could reﬂect exposure
to more balanced reporting (though CNN and the network news are available in all towns in
the sample) or merely lower audience rates for Fox News when more channels are available.
We consider also the heterogeneity across geographic regions. The eﬀect of Fox News is
highest in the North East and in the West, and signiﬁcantly lower in the Midwest. The eﬀect
is signiﬁcantly lower also in the South in the benchmark speciﬁcations, but this pattern is not
20Matching also on county indicator variables was not feasible due to excessive number of matching variables.
20signiﬁcant and even reverses in the optimally trimmed sample. These results should be taken
with caution in light of the small number of observations in the South (725 towns) and West
(689 towns). We also interact the results with the political orientation in the District. We split
congressional districts into thirds by the 2000 Republican vote share. The Fox News eﬀect is
lower for the more Republican districts, signiﬁcantly so with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
The lower impact of Fox News in the Republican districts and states (the South) and in
rural towns areas may be explained by the fact that in these towns most people already voted
Republican, and therefore the share of the population at risk of being convinced was smaller.
Magnitudes. Across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the entry of Fox News into a cable market
by the year 2000 had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the Republican vote share in Presidential elections.
The implied conﬁdence intervals for the benchmark estimates (Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4)
are (.0008, .0072) with district ﬁxed eﬀects and (.0041,.0097) with county ﬁxed eﬀects. The
ﬁndings, therefore, are consistent with both a small (but positive) eﬀect of Fox News and a
fairly large eﬀect, close to one percentage point.
How large are these eﬀects relative to shifts in vote share between 1996 and 2000? The
average weighted change in vote share between 1996 and 2000 in our sample is 3.47 percentage
points, with a standard deviation of 4.02. The estimated impact of Fox News is one tenth
of a standard deviation with district ﬁxed eﬀects, and one sixth of a standard deviation with
county ﬁxed eﬀects. The impact of Fox News is small, but not negligible.
As a second measure, we estimate the number of votes that Fox News is likely to have
shifted. We assume a treatment eﬀect of Fox News of .54 percentage points, the midpoint of
the benchmark estimates, and a diﬀusion of Fox News of 34 percent of the population, also
for the 22 States for which we do not have data. The estimated impact of Fox News on the
Republican vote share is then .34 ∗ (.0054) = .0018, that is, .18 percentage points. Assuming
that Fox News did not aﬀect turnout substantially, Fox News shifted approximately 200,000
votes from the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate.
We also predict the number of votes shifted by Fox News in Florida, the pivotal State. In
2000, Fox News reached 32.8 percent of the Florida population. We assume that the Fox News
eﬀect on the 5,963,110 Florida votes cast is the same as in our sample. Under this assumption,
the introduction of Fox News shifted .328 ∗ (.0054) ∗ 5,963,110 = 10,561 votes, a number
substantially larger than Bush’s oﬃcial margin of victory of 537 votes. The estimated impact
of Fox News would be smaller, and potentially negative, under the alternative assumption that
the eﬀect in Florida is the same as in the Southern states (Table 6, Columns 5 through 8).21
Overall, the impact of the entry of Fox News can be measured as about one tenth of
a standard deviation of the shift toward Republicans between 1996 and 2000. While this
estimate is moderately small, the entry of Fox News may still have contributed to the Bush
21This second computation should be taken with caution given the fact that Florida, a swing state, is diﬀerent
from all the Southern states in the sample, which are markedly Republican.
21victory in the unusually close 2000 election. Moreover, the impact may become larger over
time as the Fox News audience and diﬀusion grows.
5.4 Timing of eﬀects
So far, we have considered the impact of the availability of Fox News in 2000 on elections
between 1996 and 2000. Now we further exploit the timing of the Fox News entry: (i) we
consider the eﬀect of the availability of Fox News in 1998 and 2004; (ii) we examine the eﬀect
of the availability of Fox News in 2000 on the change in vote share between 1992 and 1996,
and between 2000 and 2004. These speciﬁcations allow us to estimate the eﬀect of length of
exposure, to further control for time trends, and to construct placebo treatments.
For 16 of the 28 states22 in the sample, we collected the availability of Fox News in November
1998. Out of 6,672 towns in this subsample, 1,221 towns oﬀer Fox News in 2000, and 666 towns
oﬀer it in 1998. The diﬀerence between 1998 and 2000 is almost exclusively due to expansion
of Fox News: only 29 towns have Fox News in 1998 but not in 2000. In Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 7, we re-estimate speciﬁcation (5) including also the indicator dFOX
k,1998 for the availability
of Fox News in 1998. The estimated impact is negative and insigniﬁcant. Length of exposure
to Fox News does not appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, but these results should be taken
with caution given the smaller sample and the lower audience rates for Fox News in 1998.
We also collected data on Fox News diﬀusion in March 2004 for the 28 states in our sample.
In this period, Fox News is available in 4,844 out of 8,645 towns.23 In Columns 3 and 4, we
re-estimate speciﬁcation (5) including the indicator variable dFOX
k,2004 for the availability of Fox
News in 2004. This is a placebo speciﬁcation, since the introduction of Fox News after the year
2000 should not aﬀect the change in vote share between 1996 and 2000. Indeed, controlling
for Fox News availability in 2000, Fox News availability in 2004 has no eﬀect on voting.
In Columns 5 and 6, we take further advantage of the staggered nature of the Fox News
introduction to address endogeneity issues. The endogeneity story holds that the impact of
Fox News on the Republican vote share is due to the fact that Fox News was introduced in
towns that were becoming more Republican anyway. While the ﬁndings in Table 3 address
this concern, as an additional test we consider the 4,844 towns that got Fox News by 2004.
We compare the vote share change between 1996 and 2000 for the towns that had Fox News
already in 2000 with the towns that introduced it only after 2000. These two sets of towns
should have similar political trends, but only the former set was exposed to Fox News before
the 2000 elections. The estimated impact of the availability of Fox News in 2000 is similar to
22To save coding time, we only collected this data for the states that we assessed to have the best election data
(excepted New Jersey, that was added later to our sample): Alaska, California, Connecticut, Iowa (part of),
Idaho, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
I s l a n d ,V e r m o n t ,a n dW i s c o n s i n .
23We exclude 281 towns which oﬀer Fox News in 2004 in one, but not all of the cable systems in the town.
22the one in the benchmark speciﬁcations, with larger standard errors due to the smaller sample:
ˆ βF = .0034 with district ﬁxed eﬀects and ˆ βF = .0061 (signiﬁcant) with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
Again, voting trends do not appear to explain the Fox News eﬀect on voting.
In Columns 7 through 10 we re-estimate speciﬁcation (5) with voting in diﬀerent years as
dependent variables. The introduction of Fox News in 2000 is associated with an insigniﬁcant
.2 percentage point vote share increase between 2000 and 2004 (Columns 7 and 8). The eﬀect
of Fox News appears to be permanent, if not increasing over time.
As a placebo treatment we estimate whether the introduction of Fox News in 2000 predicts
the vote share change between 1992 and 1996 (Columns 9 and 10). Obviously, Fox News
introduction in 2000 should not aﬀect voting between years in which Fox News did not exist.
We ﬁnd no evidence of a positive correlation; in fact, the estimates are negative though not
signiﬁcant. Voting trends are unlikely to be responsible for the Fox News eﬀect.
5.5 Senate elections
The previous ﬁndings suggest that Fox News had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the Republican vote
share in the Presidential election. In this Section, we consider whether the eﬀect of Fox News
extends to local politics not covered by Fox News. This allows us to test whether the Fox News
eﬀect is candidate-speciﬁc or a general ideological shift.
Senate elections are a good test in this respect, because a large majority of Senate races fail
to get national coverage. These elections are similar to local elections, for which unfortunately
no town-level data set is available. At the same time, one or two Senate races per year attract
substantial national coverage, almost like Presidential races. This allows us to compare the
eﬀect on Fox News on races that were not covered, where only ideological shifts should matter,
to the eﬀect on covered races, where candidate-speciﬁc coverage also could matter. In 2000, the
Senate race that got the most coverage in Fox News by a wide margin was the Hillary Clinton-
Rick Lazio race in New York State. These two candidates had 99 mentions in the O’Reilly
Factor and the Hannity & Colmes show in the two months prior to the 2000 elections, with
most mentions critical of Hillary Clinton24. All the other Senate candidates running in the
2000 campaign combined got a total of 73 mentions, with Joe Lieberman, who was typically
mentioned because of his Vice-Presidential race, getting the lion’s share of these mentions.
We examine whether Fox News impacted the vote share in Senate elections, and whether
it had a diﬀerential eﬀect for the Clinton-Lazio race. We denote by dNY the indicator variable
24Two excerpts from the “O’Reilly Factor” of 10/31/2000: “Now, I am saying to THE FACTOR viewers, and
everyone else who hears what we have to say on this program, that Mrs. Clinton has trouble with honesty”;
“Mr. Gore does have some honesty issues about campaign ﬁnance, but they pale beside the deceit factory the
Clintons have set up”.





k,1996 = α + βFdFOX
k,2000 + φFdFOX
k,2000 ∗ dNY
+Γ2000Xk,2000 + Γ00−90Xk,00−90 + ΓCCk,2000 + εk, (6)
where the coeﬃcient βF indicates the eﬀect of Fox News on Senate races other than New
York, and φF indicates the diﬀerential eﬀect for the featured New York race. Notice that the
dependent variable is the diﬀerence of the Senatorial vote share in 2000 and the Presidential
vote share in 1996. This speciﬁcation maximizes sample size: the voting data for the 1994
Senatorial election is available for only 5 States, not including New York state.
Table 8 reports the results. The eﬀect of Fox News on non-featured Senate races is large
and signiﬁcant, .0079 with district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 1) and .0082 with county ﬁxed eﬀects
(Column 2). Compared to this eﬀect, the eﬀect of Fox News on the New York race is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, although the standard errors on the coeﬃcient ˆ φF are relatively large.
Over the optimally trimmed subsample (Columns 3 and 4), the estimated impact of Fox
News on Senate races is positive but not signiﬁcant. In the speciﬁcation with District ﬁxed
eﬀects, Fox News appears to have had a signiﬁcantly larger eﬀect on the New York Senate race
(ˆ φF = .014), but the result does not replicate with county ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 4). In Column
5, we use the ratio of Fox News subscribers to population in lieu of the Fox News dummy. The
result is very similar to the baseline estimate, suggesting a substantial impact of Fox News on
all Senate races. We then test for heterogeneity by political areas (Column 6). The Fox News
eﬀect is (marginally) signiﬁcantly lower for the more Republican districts, suggesting that Fox
News had the largest impact in Democratic or swing districts. Finally, the results using the
all-party vote share (Column 7) parallel the benchmark ﬁnding in Column 1.
In the last two columns (Columns 8 and 9) we re-estimate (6) using the diﬀerence in the
two-party Republican vote share between the 2000 and the 1994 Senate races as the dependent
variable. This allows us to compare two races both featuring the 2000 incumbent, at the cost
of reducing the sample to 2,037 towns in 5 States (Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and
Rhode Island). In this small sample, we ﬁnd large and signiﬁcant eﬀects of Fox News in the
order of one percentage point. While these estimates are less precise, they corroborate the
ﬁnding of a substantial eﬀect of Fox News on Senate races.
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect of Fox News also for non-featured races such as
Senate races, specially in Democratic and swing districts. We fail to ﬁnd a stronger eﬀect for
highly emphasized races. These results suggest that Fox News exposure induces a generalized
ideological shift, as opposed to a candidate-speciﬁce ﬀect.
5.6 Voter turnout
The signiﬁcant impact of Fox News on the Republican vote share could occur for two reasons.
First, Fox News entry convinced Democratic voters to vote Republican. Second, Fox News
24attracted new Republican voters. We use measures of turnout to test these hypotheses.
The baseline regression for voter turnout is:
tPres
k,2000 − tPres
k,1996 = α + βFdFOX
k,2000 + γ [ln(Popk,2000) − ln(Popk,1996)] (7)
+Γ2000Xk,2000 + Γ00−90Xk,00−90 + ΓCCk,2000 + εk,
where tPres
k,t is the log total votes in town k in year t: tPres
k,t =l n ( V
TOT,Pres
k,t ). The change in this
measure over time is the percent change in total votes cast. This speciﬁcation controls for the
percentage change in the voting-age town population over time, ln(Popk,2000)−ln(Popk,1996),
since increases in population would naturally increase the number of votes cast.
Table 9 shows the results. The average change in log votes is .0869, implying a 8.69 percent
higher turnout in the much tighter Presidential race of 2000. The estimate for βF is positive
but insigniﬁcant with district ﬁxed eﬀects, and is large and signiﬁcant with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
This second estimate (ˆ βF = .018) suggests that fox News increased turnout by 1.8 percent,
a large eﬀect. In both speciﬁcations, the elasticity γ of the change in votes cast with respect
to the change in population is about .4. Over the optimally trimmed subsample (Columns 3
and 4), the Fox News eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant with county ﬁxed eﬀects, and marginally
signiﬁcant with district ﬁxed eﬀects. The Fox News coeﬃcient ˆ βF is positive but insigniﬁcant
using the ratio of subscribers to Fox News (Column 5). The turnout eﬀect is concentrated in
the more Democratic districts (Column 6). Together with the ﬁnding that the impact of Fox
News on vote share is larger in the more Democratic areas, this suggests that the main eﬀect
of Fox News was to induce non-voters in Democratic districts to turn out and vote Republican.
Finally, in Columns 7 and 8 we replicate the results of Columns 1 and 2 with an alternative
turnout measure: t
j0
k,t =l n ( V
TOT,j
k,t /Popk,t). This speciﬁcation is equivalent to speciﬁcation (7),
with the additional restriction γ = 1 (rejected by the data). The point estimates are slightly
smaller, and still signiﬁcant with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
Overall, Fox News entry into a market appears to have mobilized new voters, specially in
Democratic districts. However, the evidence is not as clear-cut as for the eﬀect on vote share.
6 Interpretations
This paper studies the eﬀects on voting of one of the most dramatic media shifts in past
years. We ﬁnd that the introduction of a (comparatively speaking) conservative news channel
increased the vote share of Republican presidential candidates by .4 to .7 percentage points.
We now evaluate the magnitude of this eﬀect, compare it to other media eﬀects in the lit-
erature, and put forward interpretations of the results. In particular, we estimate a persuasion
rate, that is, the share of the Fox News audience that was convinced by Fox News to vote
Republican. Clearly, Republican voters or people that were not watching Fox News could not
25have been convinced. From an econometric standpoint, we do a calculation of treatment on
the treated using the average treatment eﬀect.
6.1 Persuasion rates
Model. To compute persuasion rates, we compare treatment towns T, where Fox News is
available via cable, and control towns C, where Fox News is not available via cable. We denote
by r the share of Republican voters, and by d the share of Democratic voters, before the
introduction of Fox News. For simplicity, we neglect third parties. Consequently, (1 − r − d)
denotes the share of non-voters. Since the two types of towns have similar political outcomes
in the pre-Fox News period (Tables 2 and 3), we assume that r and d are the same in towns
T and C.
After the nation-wide introduction of Fox News, a fraction e of the town population is
exposed to the new channel. The exposure parameter e is higher in treatment towns, that is,
eT >e C ≥ 0. We allow exposure eC in control towns to be non-zero because, for example,
of the availability of satellite which broadcasts Fox News to subscribers in both towns. For
simplicity, we also assume that the exposure ej to Fox News in town j is independent of political
aﬃliation. That is, we assume that Republicans are as likely as Democrats or non-voters to
watch Fox News when available. While the evidence in Table 1 suggests that Republicans are
more likely to watch Fox News, we cannot rule out that this captures the causal convincing
eﬀect of Fox News, rather than diﬀerential exposure ej by party.
The key parameter in the model is f, the fraction of the audience that is convinced by
Fox News to vote Republican. This persuasion rate, f applies equally to Democratic voters
and to non-voters, that is, to a fraction (1 − r) of the Fox News audience ej, where j = T,C.
Therefore, the introduction of Fox News increases the fraction of people voting Republican by
(1 − r)ejf. The two-party vote share vj in town j, with j = T,C, equals
vj =
r +( 1− r)ejf
r + d +( 1− r − d)ejf
. (8)
(Turnout increases since Fox News induces a fraction f of the non-voters to vote Republican.)
Using expression (8), we solve for the diﬀerence in vote share between treatment and control
towns,v T − vC, the equivalent of ˆ βF in the data. We obtain vT − vC =( eT − eC)fd/tCtT,
where tj ≡ (r + d +( 1− r)ejf)i st h et u r n o u ti nt o w nj. The implied persuasion rate f is
f =
vT − vC




Expression (9) is easily interpretable. The ﬁrst term is the inﬂuence rate per treated
population, and the second term is a factor correcting for turnout eﬀects. The numerator of
the ﬁrst term, vT − vC, is the shift in Republican vote share due to the availability of Fox
26News via cable. The denominator, (eT − eC)(1− r), normalizes this vote shift by the share of
population at-risk of treatment, that is, by the diﬀerential exposure to Fox News in treatment
and control towns, times the share of non-Republicans.
The second term, which disappears if turnout is perfect (r+d =1 ) , captures the diﬀerence
between the convincing eﬀect of Fox News on a Democrat and a non-voter. In both cases,
Republicans gain a vote, but only in the ﬁrst case the opposing party, the Democratic party,
loses a vote. Converting a Democrat, therefore, has a larger impact on the vote share than
converting a non-voter. The larger the ratio of non-Republicans (1 − r)t oD e m o c r a t s ,d, hence,
the bigger is the convincing impact for a given vote share change. In addition, the term tCtT
in (9) corrects for the fact that a higher turnout tj increases the denominator of expression
(8), and therefore decreases the impact of f on vj.
We estimate the persuasion rate f using expression (9). First, we evaluate the political
variables tT, tC, r, and d using the sample averages of the 2000 elections. We weight the
averages by total votes cast in 2000 to better approximate the individual-level expressions
(8) and (9). (In the robustness section, we discuss alternative estimates based on unweighted
averages.) The average weighted turnout in 2000 as a share of the voting-age population
is .560, and it is very similar in Fox News and non-Fox News towns. We therefore assume
tT = tC = .56025. We estimate the percentage of Democratic voters d as the product of
the turnout rate t and the average weighted Democratic two-party vote share in 2000 in our
sample, that is, .560 ∗ (1 − .453) = .306. This implies that f =1 .024 ∗ (vT − vC)/(eT − eC).
Audience data. We estimate the diﬀerential exposure (eT − eC) using the micro-level
Scarborough data on television audiences described in Section 3. We use the subsample of
11,388 respondents for whom we observe the ZIP code of residence, and whom we can match
by ZIP code to the cable data on availability of Fox News (Table 1, Columns 4-6). We use
the ‘diary audience’ measure, since the ‘regular audience’ measure is not available for most
of this sample. We aggregate the data at the town level to maximize comparability to the
speciﬁcations in the rest of the paper. For each town k of the 568 towns in this sample, eFOX
k
is the fraction of town residents that belong to the Fox News audience. We estimate
eFOX
k = α + βFdFOX
k,2000 + Γ2000Xk,2000 + Γ00−90Xk,00−90 + ΓCCk,2000 + εk. (10)
The regression is weighted by the number of respondents in a town, and the standard errors
are clustered at the level of the local cable company. The coeﬃcient βF is the diﬀerential Fox
News diary audience due to Fox News availability via cable in the town.
Table 10 shows the results. In the speciﬁcation without controls (Column 1), the availability
of Fox News induces 2.7 percent (ˆ βF = .0270) additional town residents to watch Fox News
for at least a full half hour per week. The estimate is signiﬁcant and sizeable. The intercept
25The average self-reported turnout in the Scarborough survey is 67.7 percent, but self-reported turnout is
known to overstate the actual ﬁgure.
27ˆ α = .0262 indicates that, in towns where Fox News is not available via cable, 2.62 percent of
the residents still watch Fox News for at least a full half hour per week. About half of the
Fox News audience, therefore, watches Fox News in ways other than via cable, possibly via
satellite. This ﬁnding could also be due to measurement error in our measure of Fox News
availability via cable. In either case, this implies that the estimates in Section 5 are likely to
understate the impact of Fox News on voting, since they capture only the impact of Fox News
availability via cable, disregarding the impact of availability in other ways.
The estimates in Column 1 do not control for demographic, geographic, or cable-system
diﬀerences between towns that adopt Fox News and towns that do not. In Columns 2 and
3, we re-estimate speciﬁcation (10) adding the Census, cable, and geographic controls used
in the body of the paper. The estimated diﬀerential exposure rates are ˆ βF = .0371 with
congressional district ﬁxed eﬀects and ˆ βF = .0251 with county ﬁxed eﬀects. Interestingly,
introducing control variables and district ﬁxed eﬀects increases the estimated ˆ βF relative to
the estimate in Column 1. Columns 4 through 6 present robustness checks. In the optimally
trimmed subsample (Column 4) the estimated exposure rate is still positive and signiﬁcant, as
is the estimate using the Fox News subscription ratio (Column 5). Finally, as a placebo test,
we check that availability of Fox News via cable in 2004 does not increase audience rates in
2000 (Column 6). Indeed, the coeﬃcient on Fox News availability in 2004 is essentially zero.
In Columns 7, 8, and 9 we replicate the speciﬁcations in Columns 1, 2, and 3 using the CNN
audience as the dependent variable. This speciﬁcation provides another placebo treatment.
Availability of Fox News via cable should not, to a ﬁrst approximation, increase the audience
for CNN, since CNN is available in all towns in our sample. In the speciﬁcation without
controls (Column 7), availability of Fox News increases CNN audience by .0251, compared to
an average audience for CNN of .0947. Once we introduce controls (Columns 8 and 9), the
availability of Fox News via cable no longer forecasts the CNN audience. The audience data,
therefore, passes this second placebo test.
Persuasion rate estimates. We estimate the diﬀerential exposure rate eT −eC using the
coeﬃcient ˆ βF of Columns 2 and 3 in Table 10. As a benchmark measure of audience, we use the
regular audience measure, because we believe that the diary measure underestimates the actual
audience. Since we cannot estimate model (10) for the regular audience variable, we multiply
the estimates of ˆ βF by a conversion rate. We compute the conversion rate as the ratio between
the aggregate regular audience and diary audience for CNN, that is, 35.3/10.3=3 .42 (Table
1, Column 4). (The ratio would be somewhat higher if we used the audience measures for Fox
News) The implied estimates for the diﬀerential exposure rate are ˆ eT−ˆ eC =3 .42∗.0371 = .1269
with district ﬁxed eﬀects and ˆ eT − ˆ eC =3 .42 ∗ .0251 = .0858 with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
We combine the estimates of the political variables (tT,t C,d) and of the audience (eT −
eC) with the estimates of the voting impact (vT − vC) to obtain a persuasion rate f. With
congressional district ﬁxed eﬀects we get ˆ f =1 .024 ∗ (.0040/.1269) = .0322, that is, Fox News
28convinced 3.22 percent of its listeners that were not already voting Republican to do so. With
county ﬁxed eﬀects, we derive ˆ f =1 .024 ∗ (.0069/.0858) = .0823, that is, Fox News convinced
8.23 percent of its audience. We summarize these results in the ﬁrst rows of Table 11.
Robustness. The estimates of the persuasion rate are robust to diﬀerent estimates of the
political parameters tC,t T, and d. If, instead of using weighted town averages, we use the
unweighted averages of turnout (t = .583) and Democratic vote share (d = .583 ∗ (1 − .538)),
we obtain tTtC/d = .583/.462 = 1.261. With this ratio, the estimated persuasion rates are
ˆ f =1 .261 ∗.0322 = .0407 with district ﬁxed eﬀects and ˆ f =1 .261 ∗.0833 = .1037 with county
ﬁxed eﬀects. These eﬀects are in the ballpark of the benchmark estimates.
The persuasion rate estimates are more sensitive to assumptions about the exposure rate
eF − eN. The persuasion rate f are 3.42 times larger if eF − eN is measured using the diary
data as the measure of audience. The resulting estimates ˆ f = .1104 (district ﬁxed eﬀects)
and ˆ f = .2814 (county ﬁxed eﬀects) imply substantial persuasion eﬀects of the media. A
second factor that leads to higher persuasion rates is the self-selection of Republicans in the
Fox News audience. In Table 10, we estimate the selective exposure eT − eC in (10) using
the whole population, rather than just Democratic voters and non-voters. To the extent that
Republicans self-select in the Fox News audience, this upward biases the estimate of eT − eC,
and therefore downward biases the estimate of f.26
Conclusion. The benchmark estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 8 percent
of its audience to shift its voting behavior towards the Republican party, a sizeable media
persuasion eﬀect. Alternative estimates using the diary audience measure lead to estimates of
the persuasion rate between .11 and .28, corresponding to large media eﬀects.
6.2 Comparison with persuasion rates in the literature
We estimate persuasion rates f for other studies in the literature, summarized in Table 11.
We discuss ﬁeld experiments, laboratory experiments, and surveys.
Field experiments. Green and Gerber (2004) summarizes a series of ﬁeld experiments
on turnout. In some of these experiments, target households within a precinct are randomly
selected to receive turn-out-the-vote treatments (canvassing, phone calls, or leaﬂets) right
before an election. Turnout is measured using oﬃcial individual voting records kept at the
precinct. In other experiments, the randomization is done at the precinct level, and precinct-
level turnout is compared across precincts. We denote by tT the share of individuals that turn
out to vote in the treatment group, and by tC the correspondent variable in the control group.
As above, denote by eT and eC the respective exposure rates, and by t the underlying turnout
rate. Also, like in Section 6.1, we assume that the treatment convinces a fraction f of the
26Unfortunately, we cannot restrict the estimation of (10) to non-Republicans, since the party identiﬁcation
variable is measured in 2000 and it captures the causal eﬀe c to fF o xN e w s ,a sw e l la ss o r t i n g .
29people that do not usually turn out and are exposed, that is, (1 − t)ej, for j = T,C. It follows







In these experiments, eC = 0 since no one in the control group is exposed to the treatment,
hence t = tC. In Table 11 we summarize ﬁve such experiments, with treatment (Column 1),
election type (Column 2), year and place (Columns 4 and 5). We also present the sample size
(Column 6), the turnout rates in the control (tC) and treatment (tT) groups (Columns 7 and
8), and the diﬀerential exposure rate eT − eC (Column 9). Using this information and (11),
we compute the persuasion rate f (Column 10). Canvassing and phone calls convinced to vote
between 4 and 26 percent of the people that would not have voted otherwise.
More recently, Gerber et al. (2006) randomly assign subscriptions to a right-wing newspaper
(Washington Times) or a left-wing newspaper (Washington Post), and consider the eﬀect on
stated voting behavior in a post-election survey. They ﬁnd a substantial increase in the share
of (stated) Democratic voters for exposure to the left-wing newspaper, corresponding to a
persuasion rate f of .109. (We use expression (11) where t is the share of Democratic votes
out of all survey respondents, including non-voters)27 However, they also ﬁnd that the share
of Democratic voters increases after exposure to the right-wing paper, albeit insigniﬁcantly.
Laboratory experiments. Ansolabehre and Iyengar (1995) expose experimental sub-
jects to 30-second political advertisements supporting a candidate (or criticizing the opposite
candidate). They then elicit beliefs and voting intentions at the end of the experiment. In
T a b l e1 1w es u m m a r i z et h eﬁndings for three sets of experiments with 1,716 total subjects.
On average, exposure to one advertisement increases the stated vote share for the sponsoring
party from .530 to .568.28 Expression (11) (where t indicates the intention to vote for the
sponsoring party) yields a sizeable persuasion rate f of .08. Other experiments by the authors
(results not reported) lead to persuasion rates of similar or larger magnitudes.
Surveys. Following Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944), political scientists have
widely used surveys to assess the impact of the media. A survey in this tradition (Kull et
al., 2003) ﬁnds that 33 percent of Fox News watchers believe (erroneously) that weapons of
mass destruction were found in Iraq by October 2003, compared to 22 percent for the overall
sample. We compute a persuasion rate f of .141 (Table 11) using an expression parallel to
(11) where t is the share of respondents who believe that weapons were found. Along similar
27We thank the authors for providing the data necessary for this calculation. By computing the share of
Democratic voters out of all survey respondents, including non-voters, we can use expression (11) instead of
expression (9).
28We use the data in Tables B1.1 and B2.4 in Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) neglecting voters that state
the intention not to vote. We obtain the baseline share of voters tC from Table B1.1 as the weighted average
share of the subjects with the same party aﬃliation as the sponsoring party: (50/(50 + 38)) ∗ 46/(46 + 18) +
(38/(50 + 38)) ∗ 18/(46 + 18).
30lines, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) examine the eﬀect of media exposure in the Islamic world.
Members of the CNN audience were 30 percent more likely to believe, and members of the Al
Jazeera audience were 40 percent less likely to believe, that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks,
compared to survey respondents who watched neither. The estimates imply persuasion rates
between .08 and .10. While the survey estimates could be due to sorting rather than causal
eﬀects, the implied persuasion rates are quite close to the other estimates.
6.3 Explanations
Our estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 8 percent of the audience to vote Republican,
as i z e a b l em e d i ae ﬀect. We consider three explanations for this ﬁnding: one statistical, one
rational, and one non-rational.
1. Endogeneity Bias. The Fox News eﬀect on voting may be a spurious correlation.
Towns where Fox News entered were becoming more Republican and would have voted more
conservatively, independent of Fox News entry. Thus, the Fox News variable proxies for un-
derlying political trends. However, contrary to this interpretation, conditional on the controls,
vote shares in 1996 and voting trends in 1988-1992 do not predict the introduction of Fox News
(Table 3). Moreover, Fox News introduction does not predict political voting trends between
1992 and 1996 (before the introduction), or between 2000 and 2004 (after the introduction)
(Table 7). Fox News only aﬀects vote share changes between 1996 and 2000. Therefore, it is
unlikely that endogeneity of Fox News introduction explains the results.
2. Rational Learning. The model in Section 2 suggests a rational learning interpretation
for the results. When Fox News entered in 1996, viewers were unsure of its political bias.
Therefore, upon seeing Fox News’ positive coverage of Bush, they interpreted it as a positive
signal about the Republican candidate and shifted their vote. A ﬁrst issue with this inter-
pretation is that, arguably, by the year 2000 the conservative slant of Fox News should have
been clear. In this case, exposure to Fox News would not have aﬀected voting. Second, even
if the political orientation of Fox News was not clear by the year 2000, it should have become
clear over time. As voters become aware of Fox News’ political slant, they should adjust their
updating techniques to ﬁlter out Fox’s bias. Contrary to this prediction, the Fox News eﬀect
over the 2000-2004 period gets if anything larger (Table 7).
3. Persuasion. The model provides an alternative, behavioral interpretation of the results.
Viewers do not fully take into account the bias of the media source and therefore are subject
to persuasion upon exposure. If voters suﬀer from persuasion, the eﬀect of Fox News on voting
may well be permanent, consistent with the empirical ﬁndings.
Overall, we ﬁnd the data to be most consistent with the third interpretation, that voters do
not optimally ﬁlter out media bias. Rational learning, however, can also explain the ﬁndings.
The two interpretations have very diﬀerent long-run predictions. Learning predicts that Fox
31New’s political eﬀect is temporary. Persuasion predicts that Fox News permanently altered
voting patterns in the United States.
Whether the eﬀect is rational or not, it would be interesting to know the exact mechanism
by which Fox News aﬀected voting. The Senate results suggest that the eﬀect is not due only
to candidate-speciﬁc coverage, but rather to a general ideological shift. Beyond this, we cannot
tell if the eﬀect is due to conservative slant of the news or to the choice of topics like National
Security that favor Republicans, as implied by the agenda setting theory (Cohen, 1963).
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the impact of media bias upon voting. We consider one of the most dramatic
changes in the US media in recent years, the sudden expansion of the Fox News cable channel
from 1996 to 2000. We exploit the natural experiment induced by the timing of the entry of
the Fox News channel in local cable markets. We estimate the impact of the availability of
Fox News in 2000 on the Republican vote share and on voter turnout. This provides a test of
whether exposure to media bias aﬀects political beliefs and voting.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of exposure to Fox News on voting. Towns with Fox News have
a 0.4 to 0.7 percentage point higher Republican vote share in the 2000 Presidential elections,
compared to the 1996 elections. A vote shift of this magnitude is likely to have been decisive in
the 2000 elections. We also ﬁnd an eﬀect on vote share in Senate elections which Fox News does
not cover, suggesting that the Fox News impact extends to general political beliefs. Finally,
we ﬁnd evidence that Fox News increased turnout to the polls.
Based on this evidence and on micro-level audience data, we estimate that exposure to Fox
News induced 3 to 8 percent of the non-Republican viewers to vote for the Republican party.
This estimate is consistent with ﬁeld and laboratory evidence of media eﬀects on political beliefs
and voting. This suggests that the media can have a sizeable political impact, especially when
a politician controls a substantial share of the media, as Berlusconi does in Italy.
We interpret the results in light of a simple model of voter learning about media bias and
about politician quality. The Fox News eﬀect could be a temporary learning eﬀect for rational
voters, or a permanent eﬀect for voters subject to non-rational persuasion.
This paper leaves a number of open questions on the impact of media bias. First, while we
analyze the extensive margin of voting, we do not consider the eﬀect on the intensity of political
convictions of Republican voters. In ongoing research, we study the impact on the intensive
margin of campaign contributions. Second, we have not directly examined the impact of the
media on policy-making. While a vote shift toward Republicans is likely to induce a change
in policy (Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004), direct evidence documenting this eﬀect would be
interesting. Finally, we hope that more evidence on the eﬀect of other sources of media bias,
such as local papers and radio talk shows, will complement the evidence in this paper.
32AA p p e n d i x A - D a t a
Cable data. The source for the cable data is the Television and Cable Factbook 2001 (refer-
ring to year 2000). A typical entry from the Pennsylvania state section is:
“KING OF PRUSSIA (Pa)–Comcast Cable. Counties: Delaware and Montgomery. Also
serves: Collegeville, Graterford, Graterford Prison, Gulph Mills, Perkiomen, Rahns, Schmenksville,
Skipjack, Swedeland, Trappe, Upper Merion Twp., Upper Providence Twp. (Delaware County),
Wayne. Account No: PA0050. [...]
Basic Service: Subscribers 17,692. [...] Programming (received oﬀ-air): WFMZ-TV (I);
WLVT-TV (P) Allentown; WGTW (I) Burlington; KYW-TV (C); [...]. Programming (via
satellite): C-SPAN; EWTN; Fox Family Channel; MSNBC; QVC; TBS Superstation; The
Box. [...] Fee: $35 installation (aerial); [...] $21.95 monthly. [...]
Expanded Basic Service: Subscribers 17,138. Programming (via satellite): A&E; AMC;
Bravo; CNBC; CNN; Comedy Central; Discovery Channel; E!; ESPN; ESPN 2; Headline
N e w s ;H i s t o r yC h a n n e l ;L i f e t i m e ;M T V ;N i c ka t Nite; Nickelodeon; Sci-Fi Channel; TLC;
TNN; TNT; TWC; The Sports Network; USA Cable; VH1. Fee: N.A.
Pay Service 1: Pay units: 845. Programming (via satellite): Cinemax. Fee: $15 installation;
$8.95 monthly.
Pay Service 2: [....]
Ownership: Comcast Cable Communications Inc.”
Each entry is listed by State under the name of the principal community, which is the town
where a given local cable company’s business oﬃce is located. The additional communities
reached by the local cable company are listed in alphabetical order, typically without indication
of the county, which is listed separately (the number of counties is rarely more than three).
In the example above, the communities listed belong to one of two counties (Delaware and
Montgomery) in Pennsylvania. Since we do not know which belongs to which, we generate
all combinations of town and county, except in cases where the county is explicitly listed as
in “Upper Providence Twp. (Delaware County)”. When we match the cable data with the
Census and election data, the ﬁctitious town-county combinations drop out. (The town-county
combination that do not match to either election or Census data are already dropped from
Column 1 in Appendix Table 1) The only possibility of error in the match is if there are two
towns with the same name in the multiple counties listed, but in this case we expect the county
to be explicitly listed next to the town name. In a few cases, the communities reached are
indicated only as fractions of a county, such as ”Alameda County (Western borders)”. We
exclude these communities, since we cannot match them to voting data. As long as these
communities do not include other separately-listed towns in the cable data, their deletion will
not bias the measure of cable oﬀerings for the other towns. As a robustness check, we recompute
the results in the paper excluding the 149 counties which include one such community where
Fox News is available. All the results hold in this smaller sample of 8,262 towns.
The Basic Service description lists all the local television stations that the cable company
rebroadcasts under the heading “Programming (received oﬀ- a i r ) ” . W ed i s r e g a r dt h e s el o c a l
stations. We estimate instead the number of cable channels broadcast in the “Programming
(via satellite)” section. In order to save coding time, the total number of channels is estimated
counting the number of lines listing cable channels in the Basic and Expanded Basic 1, 2,
and 3 Services. The estimated number of channels follows by multiplying this number by 2.5,
a conversion rate estimated on a subsample of 40 cable companies. Over this subsample, a
regression of actual number of channels on forecasted number of channels yields an R2 of .95
and a coeﬃcient of 1.
Finally, it is worth noting that sometimes the number of subscribers or (as in this case) the
price of the subscription is missing, or refers to previous years.
33B Appendix B - Derivation of the Model
Estimation of ˆ βT. The voters observe the T signals ψ1,ψ 2,...,ψ T before casting votes for
the T-th candidates. These signals are all independently normally distributed. Therefore, the
estimate of β, b βT, is a precision-weighted sum of signals. Since the weighted sum of these
signals is a normally distributed random variable, it is completely characterized by the ﬁrst
two moments. Denoting the estimated bias after T periods by b βT, we obtain expression (1).
Computation of W. We compute the precision W of the preliminary estimate ψT − b βT for
the rational case (λ = 0); this precision is used, by assumption, also by voters with persuasion
λ>0. For a given race concerning candidates at time T, rational viewers (λ =0 )f o r ma
preliminary expectation of quality, b θP
T = ψT − b βT:
b θP
T =



















where the second step follows from substituting ψt = θt + β and combining terms. Note that
since b θP
T is an estimate of θT, its variance does not itself depend on θT but does on all other








where W is the precision of b θP
T .T h i si m p l i e sW =( γβ + Tγθ)
2 /(γβ +( T − 1)γθ).
Estimation of b θλ
T (b θλ
T = b θT for λ =0 ). Now that we have obtained ˆ β and W, we
solve the signal extraction for the case of λ-persuasion. Voters with λ-persuasion form a
diﬀerential quality estimate for politician pair T, b θλ
T, by taking a precision-weighted average of
the prior quality diﬀerential between candidates, 0 with precision γθ, and the estimated one,
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Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. The proof of Proposition 1 follows immediately from
taking derivatives and limits for T →∞ : ∂(b θλ
T)/∂β = W (γβ + λTγθ)/[(γβ + Tγθ)(γθ + W)] >
0 (Proposition 1.(i)) and ∂2(b θλ
T)/∂β∂λ = WTγθ/[(γβ + Tγθ)(γθ + W)] > 0 (Proposition 1.(i))
(Proposition 1.(iii.) uses the fact that limT→∞ W/(γθ + W) = 1). For Proposition 2(i), we use
∂[1−F(−b θλ
T)]/∂β = f(−b θλ
T)∗∂(b θλ
T)/∂β together with f>0. For Proposition 2(ii), note that for
λ =0l i m T→∞ ∂(b θλ
T)/∂β = 0 and therefore, since f is bounded, limT→∞ ∂[1−F(−b θλ
T)]/∂β =0 .
For T very large and λ>0, the derivative ∂[1−F(−b θλ
T)]/∂β remains positive since ∂(b θλ
T)/∂β →
λ and f>0 .( N o t i c et h a tt h i sd o e sn o tr e q u i r ef(−b θλ
T)t oh a v eal i m i t . )
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Figure 1.  Fox News Availability by County, 2000.
Note: Proportion for each county is calculated as the ratio of number of towns with Fox News available via cable to total number of towns in the county.  
Alaska and Hawaii are also in the data set, but are not included on the map due to space constraints.Sample:
All Fox News Fox News All Fox News Fox News
Regular Non-Regular Diary Non-Diary
Audience Audience Audience Audience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fox News 0.173 1 0 0.166* 0.591* 0.146*
(Regular Audience) (0.379) . . (0.372) (0.493) (0.353)
Fox News 0.035 1 0
(Diary Audience) (0.185) . .
CNN 0.341 0.619 0.283 0.353* 0.603* 0.341*
(Regular Audience) (0.474) (0.486) (0.451) (0.478) (0.490) (0.474)
CNN 0.103 0.350 0.094
(Diary Audience) (0.304) (0.478) (0.292)
Some College 0.214 0.219 0.213 0.215 0.206 0.215
(0.410) (0.414) (0.410) (0.411) (0.405) (0.411)
College Graduate 0.344 0.356 0.341 0.386 0.452 0.384
(0.475) (0.479) (0.474) (0.487) (0.498) (0.486)
African American 0.097 0.111 0.094 0.084 0.020 0.086
(0.296) (0.314) (0.292) (0.277) (0.140) (0.281)
Hispanic 0.107 0.081 0.112 0.180 0.094 0.183
(0.309) (0.273) (0.315) (0.384) (0.293) (0.387)
Unemployment 0.022 0.018 0.023 0.023 0.005 0.024
(0.147) (0.134) (0.149) (0.151) (0.070) (0.153)
Age 45.679 49.744 44.827 44.506 51.727 44.241
(16.633) (16.995) (16.429) (16.443) (16.362) (16.386)
Male 0.424 0.481 0.412 0.427 0.526 0.423
(0.494) (0.500) (0.492) (0.495) (0.500) (0.494)
Republican 0.282 0.375 0.262 0.267 0.536 0.257
(0.450) (0.484) (0.440) (0.442) (0.499) (0.437)
Democrat 0.319 0.294 0.324 0.335 0.159 0.342
(0.466) (0.455) (0.468) (0.472) (0.366) (0.474)
Voter Turnout 0.693 0.769 0.677 0.677 0.819 0.672
(0.461) (0.421) (0.468) (0.468) (0.386) (0.470)
Cable 0.687 0.784 0.666 0.754 0.886 0.749
(0.464) (0.411) (0.471) (0.431) (0.318) (0.434)
Satellite 0.147 0.138 0.149 0.104 0.122 0.103
(0.354) (0.344) (0.356) (0.305) (0.327) (0.304)






* The number of observations for Fox News (Regular Audience) is 5,070 in Column 4, 237 in Column 5, and 5,307 in Column 6. Same number of
observations for CNN (Regular Audience).
Table 1. Determinants of Fox News Audience (Scarborough Data)
Notes: Data from Scarborough Research. Columns 1 through 3 show mean and standard deviation of variables in the whole US sample (August 2000-
March 2001, Column 1) and in the subsamples of regular Fox News audience (Column 2) and non-regular Fox News audience (Column 3). Columns 4
through 6 show mean and standard deviation of variables in the subsample with ZIP code data that matches to a town in the cable and election
sample (February 2000-August 2001, Column 4) and in the subsamples of diary Fox News audience (Column 5) and non-diary Fox News audience
(Column 6). Regular Fox News audience is an indicator variable for response to "Do you watch regularly the Fox News Channel?". Diary Fox News




  38All Fox News No Fox Fox News No Fox Fox News No Fox
Towns in 2000 in 2000 in 2000 in 2000 in 2000 in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Channels 28.60 44.52 24.73 44.39 24.41 45.00 26.05
(14.64) (15.98) (11.31) (16.14) (11.57) (16.06) (11.81)
Potential Subscribers 78124 163622 57384 140457 47373 167006 70832
(149015) (246661) (103131) (198871) (91025) (254926) (116337)
Vote Share in 1996 0.470 0.479 0.467 0.482 0.475 0.477 0.475
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.127)
Vote Share in 2000 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.541 0.550 0.533 0.536
(0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.128) (0.126) (0.129) (0.133)
Log Turnout in 1996 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.578 -0.573 -0.566
(0.481) (0.482) (0.480) (0.471) (0.732) (0.434) (0.418)
Log Turnout in 2000 -0.522 -0.525 -0.521 -0.525 -0.518 -0.510 -0.504
(0.491) (0.497) (0.490) (0.487) (0.483) (0.449) (0.431)
Population 9612 11516 9150 10564 7157 11872 12266
(32661) (32427) (32703) (31000) (23261) (33678) (37678)
Some college 0.257 0.259 0.257 0.258 0.257 0.258 0.254
(0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067)
College 0.195 0.220 0.189 0.216 0.178 0.224 0.210
(0.133) (0.147) (0.129) (0.145) (0.118) (0.150) (0.146)
African American 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.026
(0.095) (0.082) (0.098) (0.073) (0.083) (0.084) (0.072)
Hispanic 0.031 0.035 0.030 0.032 0.027 0.035 0.041
(0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.067) (0.065) (0.074) (0.096)
Unemployed 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.053
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038)
Urban 0.406 0.537 0.374 0.518 0.331 0.556 0.441
(0.438) (0.447) (0.429) (0.446) (0.416) (0.446) (0.447)
Census Variables,
Population 704 772 687 681 584 805 934
(3457) (3775) (3375) (3499) (2727) (3974) (4461)
Some college 0.040 0.035 0.041 0.036 0.044 0.035 0.034
(0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047)
College 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.041 0.035 0.042 0.041
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043)
African American 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Hispanic 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.011
(0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028)
Unemployed -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036)
Urban 0.082 0.079 0.083 0.082 0.080 0.084 0.086
(0.238) (0.239) (0.238) (0.241) (0.240) (0.247) (0.242)
No. of observations N = 9256 N = 1807 N = 7449 N = 1734 N = 5897 N = 1548 N = 2342
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. The subset "Fox News in 2000" is formed by the towns with availability of Fox News in 2000 in the cable package. The subset "No Fox
in 2000" is the complementary groups of towns. Towns with district variation are towns in districts in which there is at least one town that does not get Fox News and one town that
does.  Towns with county variation are similarly defined except at the county level.  Potential Subscribers is defined as the total voting-age population of the towns reached by a cable 
provider. Republican two-party vote share is the votes received by the Republican candidate in the presidential election divided by the votes received by both the republican and
democratics candidates.  Log turnout is measured by the log ot the ratio of total votes cast in a given town to the voting-age population of the town. Observations unweighted.
Cable Variables:
Voting Variables:
Census Variables for 2000:
Change from 1990 to 2000:
Table 2. Summary Statistics
All Sample Mixed Districts Mixed Counties
 
  39Dep. Var.: Fox News Availability in 2000 in Cable System
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
0.6562 0.3987 -0.0324 -0.0397 -0.0326 0.0849 0.0603




Change 1988-1992 (0.2480) (0.2335)
Census controls:
-0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0011
(0.0008)**(0.0008)*** (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012)
-0.1444 0.2452 -0.0004 -0.3139 -0.0159 0.1507 0.2599
(0.4096) (0.3133) (0.1963) (0.2218) (0.1963) (0.2709) (0.2967)
0.9454 0.7312 0.0855 -0.0482 0.0738 -0.0966 0.1113
(0.3237)***(0.3171)** (0.1619) (0.1820) (0.1610) (0.2092) (0.2061)
0.5802 0.3937 -0.0098 0.077 -0.0139 -0.2132 -0.2511
(0.2169)*** (0.2020)* (0.1090) (0.1112) (0.1088) (0.1718) (0.1587)
0.1795 0.2929 -0.1197 -0.2768 -0.111 0.0788 -0.3902
(0.2980) (0.2945) (0.1972) (0.2074) (0.1974) (0.3334) (0.4148)
0.2446 0.2749 0.3494 0.2531 0.3502 0.4625 0.3597
(0.8408) (0.6388) (0.3811) (0.3542) (0.3802) (0.4309) (0.3707)
0.1453 0.0072 -0.0277 -0.0113 -0.0261 -0.0497 -0.0425
(0.0474)*** (0.0349) (0.0250) (0.0208) (0.0249) (0.0315) (0.0316)
-0.007 -0.0038 -0.0194 -0.0082 -0.0196 0.0036 -0.004
(0.0126) (0.0091) (0.0107)* (0.0080) (0.0107)* (0.0117) (0.0121)
0.4883 -0.3965 -0.1792 0.1604 -0.1938 -0.3915 -0.5782
(0.5278) (0.4170) (0.1934) (0.2043) (0.1921) (0.2383) (0.2454)**
-0.1477 -0.1977 0.0535 0.2036 0.0339 0.1602 -0.1258
(0.5281) (0.4050) (0.2079) (0.2345) (0.2087) (0.2620) (0.2582)
-1.8736 -1.3313 -0.4128 -0.3608 -0.3853 0.3925 0.4598
(0.6184)***(0.4619)*** (0.2221)* (0.2838) (0.2208)* (0.4265) (0.4647)
1.3941 0.6968 -0.0245 0.3903 -0.0248 -0.5029 0.5214
(0.8469)* (0.7308) (0.3569) (0.3720) (0.3567) (0.6976) (0.8511)
0.0647 -0.5119 -0.3538 0.0672 -0.3431 -0.2461 -0.2209
(0.6293) (0.4571) (0.2663) (0.2778) (0.2668) (0.3064) (0.3317)
-0.1377 -0.0918 -0.0037 -0.0771 -0.0059 -0.014 -0.0518
(0.0509)***(0.0393)** (0.0281) (0.0276)*** (0.0280) (0.0405) (0.0415)
Other Census Controls XXXXXXX
Control for Cable Features XXXXXX
US House District Fixed Effects XX X
County Fixed Effects XX
0.0772 0.4032 0.669 0.7673 0.6691 0.6317 0.7612
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 3722 N = 3722
Table 3. Selective Penetration of Fox News in 2000, Linear Probability Model










Chg Popul. (00-90) (10,000s)
Notes: An observation in the linear probability model is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. The dependent variable is a binary variables that equal
one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. Robust standard errors clustered by local cable company in parentheses. The observations
are weighted by average total votes cast in 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. The log turnout measure is the log of the ratio of total votes cast to voting-age
population in the town.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pres. Log Turnout in 1996
Pres. Rep. Vote Share





Chg Some College (00-90)
Chg  College Grad (00-90)
  40Dep. Var.: Republican Vote Share Change between 2000 & 1996 Pres. Elections 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0 . 0 3 4 7 ......
(0.0017)***
-0.0026 0.0027 0.0078 0.004 0.0069 0.0036 0.0049




-0.0001 0 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003
0.0000 0.0000 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)** (0.0001)***
-0.005 0.0053 -0.0657 -0.0613 -0.058 -0.0581
(0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0141)*** (0.0162)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0218)***
-0.1122 -0.1091 -0.0964 -0.1197 -0.1044 -0.1494
(0.0154)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0234)***
-0.0845 -0.0824 -0.0542 -0.0495 -0.0774 -0.0763
(0.0079)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0120)***
-0.1312 -0.1218 -0.0563 -0.0727 -0.0298 -0.047
(0.0163)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0320) (0.0266)*
0.2565 0.2699 0.1201 0.0983 0.1593 0.1744
(0.0414)*** (0.0380)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0254)*** (0.0447)*** (0.0383)***
-0.0181 -0.0062 -0.0072 -0.0053 -0.0065 -0.0074
(0.0023)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0022)***
-0.0005 -0.0004 0.0019 0.0005 0 -0.0016
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)*** (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0013)
0.0228 0.0245 0.0627 0.0566 0.0349 0.0125
(0.0253) (0.0229) (0.0153)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0211)* (0.0219)
0.0308 0.044 0.0843 0.0918 0.0555 0.0693
(0.0270) (0.0235)* (0.0127)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0197)*** (0.0209)***
-0.0803 -0.071 -0.0691 -0.093 -0.0063 -0.0445
(0.0224)*** (0.0207)*** (0.0182)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0294) (0.0281)
-0.002 -0.006 -0.0547 -0.0389 -0.0737 -0.0857
(0.0368) (0.0336) (0.0208)*** (0.0248) (0.0578) (0.0569)
-0.1885 -0.1938 -0.0627 -0.0392 -0.1159 -0.1081
(0.0322)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0219)* (0.0401)*** (0.0271)***
-0.007 -0.006 0.0033 0.0036 0.002 0.0072
(0.0027)*** (0.0026)** (0.0016)** (0.0015)** (0.0024) (0.0023)***
Other Census Controls XXXXXX
Control for Cable Features XXXXX
US House District Fixed Effects XX
County Fixed Effects XX
0.0008 0.5199 0.5557 0.7531 0.8114 0.7517 0.8228
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 3722 N = 3722
Chg Unemp. Rate (00-90)
Chg Urban (00-90)
Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. The dependent variable is the two-party republican vote share for
the 2000 presidential election minus the two-party republican vote share for the 1996 presidential election. Fox News 2000 is a binary variables that equal one if Fox
News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. The estimate of the constant is not reported for Columns 2-7. Robust standard errors clustered by local
cable company in parentheses.  The observation are weighted by average total votes cast in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.




Chg Some College (00-90)
Chg  College Grad (00-90)
Chg African Am. (00-90)
Chg Hispanic (00-90)
Two-Party Vote Share
Table 4. The Effect of Fox News on the 2000-1996 Presidential Vote Share Change
Fox News 2000










  41Log (Vote Sh.)
Change All-Party Right-Wing
Dep. Var:. 2000-1996 Vote Share Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.0039 0.0037 0.0085 0.0039 0.0048 0.0038 0.0047 0.0037 0.005






to Fox News Cable Package (0.0034)*
Census 2000 and 1990 XX X X X XXXXX
Cable System Controls XX X X X XXXXX
XX X X X XXXXX
Quartic Polynomial in 1996 Vote Share X
Unweighted, Turnout>2000 X
Outliers Dropped X
Optimal Trimmed Sample X
0.9825 0.9827 0.7093 0.8273 0.6926 0.7531 0.7529 0.7361 0.7702 0.7833
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9214 N = 3115 N = 9071 N = 4177 N
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
US House District Fixed Effects
R
2
Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the two-party republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election. In
column (3), the dependent variable is the log of the two-party Republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the same variables for the 1996 election. In columns (4)-(10), the dependent variable is the
Republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the same variables for the 1996 elections. In Column (4) the Republican vote share is computed using the all-party vote share and in Column (5) it is computed
including the Reform Party votes together with the Republican votes and the Green Party together with the Democratic votes. In Columns (6) through (10) the vote share refers to the two-party vote share. Fox News 2000 is a
binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. The Optimally trimmed Sample is defined in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by cable affiliate in parentheses. The
observations are weighted by average total votes cast in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.
Republican Vote Share in 1996
Fox News in Basic Package




Pres. Rep. Vote Share Change between 2000 & 1996 Elections 
Table 5. The Effect of Fox News on the 2000-1996 Presidential Vote Share Change. Robustness
Republican Two-
Party Vote Share in 
2000
 
  42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fox News 2000 0.008 0.0095 0.0128 0.0132 0.0074 0.0082 0.0088 0.006
(0.0037)** (0.0039)** (0.0045)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0018)***
Fox News * (No. of Channels / 10) -0.002 -0.0014 -0.0025 -0.0024
(0.0008)** (0.0009) (0.0009)*** (0.0009)**
Fox News * (Urban in 2000) 0.0052 0.0039 0.0039 0.0027
(0.0022)** (0.0019)** (0.0026) (0.0023)
Fox News * South -0.0081 -0.0146 -0.0027 0.0184
(0.0040)** (0.0067)** (0.0060) (0.0219)
Fox News * Midwest -0.0089 -0.0047 -0.0103 -0.0053
(0.0028)*** (0.0026)* (0.0034)*** (0.0032)*
Fox News * West 0.002 0.0046 -0.0021 0.0057
(0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0036)
Fox * (.46 < Average 2000 Rep. -0.0002 -0.0007 0.001 -0.0009
Vote Share In District < .54) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0023)
Fox * (Average 2000 Rep. -0.0017 -0.0065 -0.0049 -0.0109
Vote Share In District > .54) (0.0031) (0.0027)** (0.0036) (0.0034)***
Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXXXXX
Cable System Controls XXXXXXXX
US House District Fixed Effects XXXX
County Fixed Effects XXXX
XX XX
0.7536 0.8116 0.7843 0.8434 0.7544 0.8123 0.785 0.8439
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 4177 N = 4177 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 4177 N = 4177
Optimally Trimmed Sample
Dep. Var.: Republican Vote Share Change between 2000 & 1996 Presidential Elections




Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. The dependent variable is the two-party Republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the same
variable for the 1996 elections. Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. In Columns (1) through (4) the variables Urban and No. of Channels
are included in the regressions (coefficients not shown), In Columns (5) through (8) the variables South, Midwest, and West, and the indicators for political ortientation of the Districts are included in the regressions. The
Optimally trimmed Sample is defined in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by local cable company in parentheses. The observations are weighted by average total votes cast in the 1996 and 2000 presidential
elections.
Control Variables:
Table 6. Fox News and the 2000-1996 Presidential Vote Share. Interactions
 
  43Dep. Var:.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.0034 0.0072 0.0032 0.0069 0.0034 0.0061 0.0021 0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0005





Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXXX X X X X
Cable System Controls XXXXXX X X X X




0.76 0.8099 0.7524 0.8103 0.7792 0.8395 0.6289 0.6703 0.6187 0.688
N = 6672 N = 6672 N = 8645 N = 8645 N = 4844 N = 4844 N = 8605 N = 3886 N = 4006 N = 1706
Table 7. Timing of Fox News Effect on the Presidential Vote Share Change







Pres. Rep. Vote Share Change '00-'96
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share Change '04-'00






Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. In columns (1)-(6), the dependent variable is the Republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the
same variables for the 1996 elections. In columns (7)-(8), the dependent variable is the Republican vote share for the 2004 presidential election minus the same variables for the 2000 elections. In columns (9)-(10),
the dependent variable is the Republican vote share for the 1996 presidential election minus the same variables for the 1992 elections. Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of the
town's local cable package in 2000. Fox News 1998 and Fox News 2004 are similarly defined. In Columns (5) and (6) the sample is restricted to towns which have Fox News available by 2004. The Optimally trimmed




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.0079 0.0082 0.0033 0.0045 0.0105 0.0072 0.0112 0.0138
(0.0026)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0038)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0049)** (0.0056)**
0.0011 -0.0054 0.014 0.0029 -0.0009 0.003 . .






Vote Share In District < .54) (0.0046)
-0.0114
Vote Share In District > .54) (0.0065)*
Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXXX X XX
Cable System Controls XXXXXX X XX
XXX X X X
XX X
XX
0.9288 0.948 0.9275 0.9468 0.9289 0.9289 0.9257 0.7484 0.8361
N = 8192 N = 8192 N = 3877 N = 3877 N = 8150 N = 8192 N = 8192 N = 2037 N = 2037








Dep. Var.: Rep. Vote Share Change between 2000 Senate & 1996 Presidential Elections 
Fox * (Average 2000 Rep.
Subscription Ratio to Fox News
(Subscription Ratio to Fox 
* (New York Race)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Two-Party Vote Share
Fox News 2000
Fox * (.46 < Average 2000 Rep.
Fox News * (New York Race)
Control Variables:
US House District Fixed Effects
County Fixed Effects
Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 24 US States in the sample. For columns (1)-(6), the dependent variable is the two-party Republican vote share for the 2000 Senate election
minus the two-party Republican vote share for the 1996 Presidential election. For column (7) the dependent variable is the same except that we use the all-party Republican vote share rather than the two-party
Republican vote share. For columns (8)-(9), the dependent variable is the two-party Republican vote share for the 2000 Senate election minus the two-party Republican vote share for the 1994 Senate election.
Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. Fox News*(New York Race) is the interaction of the Fox News 2000 variable with an indicator
for New York's senatorial race between Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio. The Optimally trimmed Sample is defined in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by cable affiliate in parentheses. The observations
are weighted by average total votes cast in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.
 
  45Measure of Turnout:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0048 0.018 0.0081 0.0154 0.0165 0.0023 0.0173
(0.0039) (0.0051)*** (0.0042)* (0.0060)** (0.0065)** (0.0040) (0.0063)***
0.384 0.3851 0.3065 0.3159 0.3837 0.3825
Population) bw. 2000 & 1996 (0.0442)*** (0.0448)*** (0.0535)*** (0.0545)*** (0.0438)*** (0.0441)***
0.0148
to Fox News Cable Package (0.0090)
-0.0237
Vote Share In District < .54) (0.0083)***
-0.0143
Vote Share In District > .54) (0.0100)
Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXXX X X




0.6291 0.6979 0.6762 0.7341 0.6298 0.63 0.5176 0.599
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 4177 N = 4177 N = 9214 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256
US House District Fixed Effects
N
Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. For columns (1)-(6), the dependent variable is the log of total votes cast in the 2000 Presidential
elections minus the same variable in 1996. For columns (7)-(8), the dependent variable is the log of the share of total votes cast in the 2000 presidential election over the population over 18 in the
same year, minus the same measure calculated with 1996 data. The population data for 1996 is interpolated from the 1990 and 2000 Census. Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals one if
Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. The Optimally trimmed Sample is defined in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by local cable company in parentheses. The
observations are weighted by average total votes cast in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.
Fox News 2000
Share of Population Subscribing
Fox * (Average 2000 Rep.
Control Variables:
Fox * (.46 < Average 2000 Rep.
Change in Log (Voting-Age





Table 9. The Effect of Fox News on the 2000-1996 Presidential Turnout Change
Dep. Var.: Turnout Change between the 2000 & 1996 Presidential Elections 
Log (Votes Cast / 
Voting-age Population) Log (Total Votes Cast)
  46(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0 . 0 2 6 2 ..... 0 . 0 9 4 7 ..
(0.0036)*** ..... ( 0 . 0 0 5 4 ) * * * ..
0.027 0.0371 0.0251 0.0256 0.0346 0.0251 0.0042 0.0045




Via Cable in 2004 (0.0090)
Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXX XX
Cable System Controls XXXXX XX
XX X X X
XX
X
0.0655 0.3105 0.3507 0.3358 0.3093 0.3148 0.0217 0.3872 0.4262
N = 568 N = 568 N = 568 N = 392 N = 567 N = 545 N = 568 N = 568 N = 568




Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town for which both Scarborough data on diary audience, as well as cable and election data are available. Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals
one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000, and similarly for Fox News 2004. The Optimally trimmed Sample is defined in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by cable affiliate
in parentheses.  The observations are weighted by the number of survey respondents resident in the town.
Control Variables:
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




Availability of Fox News
Subscription Ratio to Fox News
Table 10. The Effect of Fox News Cable Exposure in 2000 on Fox News Audience, Scarborough Data
Dep. Var.: Share Of Town Population That Watched At Least 30 Minutes of a Channel in Past Week
 Watched Fox News  Watched CNN
 
  47Variable: Persuasion Rate f (Share of Listeners Convinced by Media)
Paper Treatment Election Type Variable t Year Place Sample Control Treatment Exposure Persuasion
or Question Size Group t T Group t C Rate e T-e C Rate f
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fox News Study
DellaVigna and Kaplan Fox News Exposure, County f.e. Presidential Republican 2000 28 US  N = 66,372,804 0.556 0.560 0.127 0.032
(2005) Fox News Exposure, Distr. f.e. Election Vote Share States 0.556 0.563 0.086 0.082
Field Experiments
Gerber and Green (2000) Door-to-Door Canvassing Federal Elect. Turnout 1998 New Haven N = 14,473 0.422 0.463 0.270 0.263
Canvassing + Mail + Calls Federal Elect. Turnout 1998 New Haven N = 14,850 0.422 0.448 0.270 0.167
Green, Gerber,  Door-to-Door Canvassing Local Elect. Turnout 2001 6 Cities N = 18,933 0.286 0.310 0.293 0.118
and Nickerson (2003)
Green and Gerber (2001) Phone Calls By Youth Vote General Elect. Turnout 2000 4 Cities N = 4,377 0.660 0.711 0.737 0.205
Phone Calls 18-30 Year-Olds General Elect. Turnout 2000 2 Cities N = 4,377 0.405 0.416 0.414 0.045
Gerber, Karlan, and Free subscription to  Governor Elect. Dem. Share 2005 Washington N = 1,011 0.291 0.363 0.940 0.109
Bergan (2006) Washington Post of Votes
Ansolabehere and  Laboratory Exposure to Governor Elect. Vote Share 1990 Southern
Iyengar (1995) 30-Second Political Ad Senate Elect. for Party 1992 California N = 1,716 0.530 0.568 1.000 0.082
Mayor Elect. Sponsoring Ad 1993
Kull et al. (2003) Respond. watches Fox News Did US find Share of Yes 2003 USA N = 8,634 0.220 0.330 1.000 0.141
WMD in Iraq? Answers
Gentzkow and Shapiro Respondent watches CNN Did Arabs do Share of Yes 2002 Arab N = 2,457 0.215 0.280 1.000 0.083
(2004) Respond. watches Al Jazeera 9/11 attack? Answers 2002 Countries N = 2,457 0.215 0.133 1.000 0.105
Table 11. Comparison with Persuasion Rates in Other Media Studies
Notes: Calculations of media effect by the authors based on data from the papers cited. Columns (7) and (8) report the share of Republican voters in the Control and Treatment group. Column (9) reports the Exposure Rate, that is, the difference between
the Treatment and the Control group in the share of people exposed to the Treatment. Column (10) computes the estimated persuasion rate f as (tT-tC)/((eT-eC)*(1-tC)), except in the first row (see Text). The persuasion rate denotes the share of the
audience that was not previously convinced and that is convinced by the message. 
Surveys
Laboratory Experiments
  48Original Final Original Final Original Final Original Final Votes Votes Popul.
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample in 2000 in 1996 in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total 0.200 0.195 0.561 0.538 0.485 0.470 4298 7171 0.686 0.704 0.659
N = 17333 N = 9256 N = 26678 N = 9256 N = 26479 N = 9256 N = 27064 N = 9256
Ak 0.262 0.175 0.621 0.612 0.506 0.510 719 2416 0.117 0.141 0.432
N = 65 N = 40 N = 294 N = 40 N = 302 N = 40 N = 311 N = 40
Al 0.115 0.097 0.565 0.566 0.497 0.505 5107 4447 0.077 0.068 0.153
N = 523 N = 113 N = 1888 N = 113 N = 1999 N = 113 N = 643 N = 113
Ar 0.220 0.205 0.521 0.497 0.391 0.357 1178 1677 0.108 0.118 0.105
N = 508 N = 122 N = 1576 N = 122 N = 1469 N = 122 N = 1658 N = 122
Ca 0.234 0.210 0.468 0.447 0.437 0.429 24070 37088 0.535 0.706 0.598
N = 1110 N = 391 N = 533 N = 391 N = 469 N = 391 N = 1007 N = 391
Ct 0.160 0.156 0.441 0.442 0.425 0.427 11738 13606 0.893 0.896 0.823
N = 188 N = 154 N = 169 N = 154 N = 168 N = 154 N = 217 N = 154
Hi 0.391 0.414 0.394 0.385 0.349 0.336 6249 5627 0.103 0.102 0.180
N = 128 N = 29 N = 294 N = 29 N = 298 N = 29 N = 145 N = 29
Ia 0.112 0.158 0.553 0.526 0.483 0.455 915 5345 0.448 0.487 0.604
N = 802 N = 247 N = 1488 N = 247 N = 1470 N = 247 N = 2388 N = 247
Id 0.107 0.184 0.777 0.735 0.652 0.589 3669 3555 0.462 0.531 0.335
N = 187 N = 87 N = 385 N = 87 N = 364 N = 87 N = 252 N = 87
Ma 0.066 0.017 0.397 0.396 0.346 0.347 11596 13794 0.880 0.883 0.827
N = 379 N = 290 N = 351 N = 290 N = 351 N = 290 N = 417 N = 290
Me 0.154 0.175 0.524 0.500 0.399 0.387 1826 2784 0.896 0.896 0.868
N = 396 N = 303 N = 508 N = 303 N = 508 N = 303 N = 532 N = 303
Mi 0.267 0.267 0.554 0.544 0.475 0.475 4463 6569 0.861 0.868 0.837
N = 1373 N = 930 N = 1413 N = 930 N = 1411 N = 930 N = 1636 N = 930
Mn 0.131 0.110 0.565 0.531 0.454 0.427 1483 3899 0.756 0.759 0.756
N = 865 N = 702 N = 2481 N = 702 N = 2444 N = 702 N = 2443 N = 702
Mo 0.096 0.094 0.607 0.579 0.507 0.478 1940 2489 0.200 0.185 0.129
N = 788 N = 212 N = 1724 N = 212 N = 1713 N = 212 N = 2116 N = 212
Mt 0.148 0.189 0.714 0.673 0.578 0.535 2535 4916 0.799 0.809 0.576
N = 142 N = 74 N = 175 N = 74 N = 181 N = 74 N = 249 N = 74
Nd 0.085 0.078 0.671 0.680 0.552 0.546 296 2219 0.260 0.246 0.300
N = 211 N = 64 N = 457 N = 64 N = 505 N = 64 N = 1600 N = 64
Nh 0.000 0.000 0.539 0.530 0.466 0.459 3737 4550 0.921 0.923 0.903
N = 268 N = 184 N = 239 N = 184 N = 240 N = 184 N = 248 N = 184
Nj 0.432 0.428 0.470 0.466 0.454 0.450 9611 10801 0.917 0.909 0.860
N = 702 N = 495 N = 538 N = 495 N = 543 N = 495 N = 647 N = 495
Ny 0.327 0.252 0.550 0.540 0.480 0.471 8793 6514 0.588 0.604 0.339
N = 1465 N = 738 N = 970 N = 738 N = 972 N = 738 N = 1615 N = 738
Oh 0.228 0.232 0.596 0.581 0.518 0.508 3741 6397 0.720 0.733 0.686
N = 1873 N = 904 N = 1572 N = 904 N = 1545 N = 904 N = 2253 N = 904
Pa 0.231 0.226 0.580 0.563 0.524 0.511 3510 4095 0.806 0.811 0.760
N = 2667 N = 1716 N = 2449 N = 1716 N = 2452 N = 1716 N = 2636 N = 1716
Ri 0.184 0.182 0.383 0.378 0.348 0.343 15400 21361 0.911 0.916 0.880
N = 49 N = 33 N = 39 N = 33 N = 39 N = 33 N = 52 N = 33
Sc 0.103 0.051 0.556 0.529 0.502 0.466 6597 8185 0.224 0.249 0.489
N = 330 N = 177 N = 1490 N = 177 N = 1468 N = 177 N = 449 N = 177
Tn 0.156 0.247 0.514 0.508 0.482 0.459 7003 4507 0.080 0.095 0.175
N = 449 N = 166 N = 1686 N = 166 N = 1686 N = 166 N = 611 N = 166
Ut 0.118 0.117 0.754 0.799 0.682 0.690 5063 5450 0.346 0.682 0.355
N = 195 N = 94 N = 334 N = 94 N = 304 N = 94 N = 285 N = 94
Va 0.096 0.116 0.568 0.561 0.525 0.503 7832 12219 0.257 0.262 0.374
N = 467 N = 147 N = 1539 N = 147 N = 1494 N = 147 N = 614 N = 147
Vt 0.018 0.017 0.478 0.470 0.389 0.389 1709 2602 0.706 0.717 0.662
N = 219 N = 117 N = 241 N = 117 N = 241 N = 117 N = 269 N = 117
Wi 0.101 0.090 0.533 0.530 0.448 0.452 2419 4274 0.714 0.720 0.715
N = 885 N = 666 N = 1628 N = 666 N = 1625 N = 666 N = 1646 N = 666
Wy 0.475 0.443 0.787 0.753 0.670 0.599 2787 4816 0.737 0.752 0.843
N = 99 N = 61 N = 217 N = 61 N = 218 N = 61 N = 125 N = 61
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics by State
Average Rep. Vote Share of Final to
Notes: Summary statistics on town-level availability of Fox News in 2000 (Columns 1 and 2), two-party vote share in 1996 and 2000  (Columns 3 through 6), and population in 2000 (Columns 
7 and 8). The data is presented for the initial sample of cable, voting, and Census data, as well as for the final sample of 9,256 observations. The averages are unweighted.




Average Rep. Vote Average Fox News 
Share in 2000  Share in 2000 
  49(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fox News 2000 0.0033 0.0066 0.0014 0.004 0.0054 0.0042 0.0022 0.0048 -0.0003 0.0017
(0.0016)** (0.0016)*** (0.0016) (0.0015)***(0.0016)*** (0.0019)** (0.0015) (0.0014)*** (0.0016) (0.0014)
Census 2000 and 1990 XXXXXXXXXX
Cable System Controls XXXXXXXXXX
District Fixed Effects XX X XX
County Fixed Effects XX XX
Specifications:
Weighted by population XX
Unweighted XXXX XX
Nearest-neighbour matching XX
Include questionable obs. XXXX
Exclude Hi, Nd, Nj, Wy XX
0.7407 0.81 0.5666 0.6796 . . 0.7539 0.8154 0.5371 0.6641
N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9256 N = 9802 N = 9802 N = 9131 N = 9131
Appendix Table 2. The Effect of Fox News on the 2000-1996 Presidential Vote Share Change. Robustness 2





Notes: An observation in the OLS regression is a town in one of the 28 US States in the sample. The dependent variable is the two-party Republican vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the same
variable for the 1996 elections. Fox News 2000 is a binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of the town's local cable package in 2000. The specifications in Columns (1) and (2) are weighted by voting-
age population in 1996. The specifications in Columns (5) and (6) are the estimate of average treatment on the treated for nearest-neighbor matching estimator, based on matching on the listed controls. The
specifications in Columns (7) through (10) include 289 towns with multiple cable systems, at least one of which carries Fox News and at least one of which does not, as well as 257 towns with likely voting data
problems. The specifications in Columns (9) and (10) exclude observations from the states of Hawaii, North Dakota, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Robust standard errors clustered by cable affiliate in parentheses,
except in Columns (5) and (6).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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